The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation by Romano, Roberta & Sanga, Sarath
The Private Ordering Solution to
Multiforum Shareholder Litigation
Roberta Romano* and Sarath Sanga*
This article analyzes a private ordering solution to multiforum shareholder litigation:
exclusive forum provisions in corporate charters and bylaws. These provisions require
that all corporate-law-related disputes be brought in a single forum, typically a court in
the statutory domicile. Using hand-collected data on the 746 U.S. public corporations
that have adopted the provision, we examine what drives the growth in these provisions
and whether, as some critics contend, their adoption reflects managerial opportunism.
We find that nearly all new Delaware corporations adopt the provision at the IPO stage,
and that the transition from zero to near-universal IPO adoption over 2007--2014 is
driven by law firms. Characteristics of individual companies appear to play little or no
role in adoption decisions. Instead, the pattern of adoption follows what can be
described as a light-switch model, in which law firms suddenly switch from never
adopting to always adopting the provision in the IPOs they advise. For post-IPO (or
“midstream”) adoptions, we compare corporate governance features of adopters to a
matched sample of nonadopters to test the hypothesis that midstream bylaw adoption
reflects managerial opportunism. If the hypothesis were correct, then we would expect
to find that the midstream adopters exhibit poor corporate governance compared to
nonadopters (using the metrics of good governance practices as identified by critics of
the provisions). We find, however, that there are either no significant differences in
governance or that it is adopters that have higher-quality governance features. We also
find no significant differences in governance and ownership structures between firms
whose boards adopt the provisions as bylaws and those who obtain shareholder
approval. The absence of significant differences across firms using disparate adoption
procedures suggests that the method of adopting an exclusive forum provision---
whether with or without shareholder approval---should not be a matter of import for
investors.
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I. Introduction
Shareholder suits against Delaware corporations have been increasingly filed in multiple
forums.1 This trend would appear to be puzzling because it is at odds with the widely
held view that the expertise of Delaware courts actually benefits shareholders.2 The
trend is less puzzling, however, if one appreciates that while this may be true on average,
it may not be true for every individual shareholder. Further, it is shareholders’ attorneys
who decide in which forum to file a lawsuit, but, as has been long-recognized in the lit-
erature, attorneys’ incentives may be misaligned with the interests of their clients.3
Commentators have proposed a number of responses to multiforum litigation,
including judicial, legislative, and private ordering solutions.4 This article focuses on
one private ordering solution: exclusive forum provisions. An exclusive forum provision
in a corporation’s charter or bylaws is analogous to a forum selection clause in a con-
tract. It identifies a single forum, most typically a court in the corporation’s statutory
domicile, as the venue for corporate-law-related disputes. The number of firms adopting
this self-help solution has dramatically increased in recent years, following its endorse-
ment by the Delaware Chancery Court and a number of other state courts.
There has been limited investigation of which firms adopt exclusive forum provi-
sions. But a better understanding of which firms adopt exclusive forum provisions would
shed light on whether shareholders should be concerned about their own firms
1E.g., John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing its Cases? 9 J. Emp. Leg. Stud. 605 (2012) [hereinafter Armour
et al., Losing]; Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Actions in State Court, 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. 349 (2012); Edward B.
Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem and Can it Be Fixed?
37 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (2012).
2E.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. (1985); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30
Del. J. Corp. L. 673, 682--83 (2005); E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate
Law, 53 Bus. Law. 681, 683, 694 (1998). Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis, 11 Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies 894 (2014) (showing that Delaware is also the most over-represented choice of law in commercial contracts).
3E.g., John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 58 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 5 (1985). As Thompson and Thomas describe multijurisdictional corporate litigation, it is “fee
distribution litigation,” that is, the function of an out-of-state forum filing is to obtain for the attorney a share of
a fee award, and not to contribute to the resolution of a dispute. Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A
Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 Nw Univ. L.
Rev. 1753, 1801 (2012). This dynamic is possible because a settlement in one forum can release the defendant
from liability for all claims related to the disputed transaction asserted by any other shareholder in any other
forum. See Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Share-
holder Litigation, 2014 Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 467, 496--97.
4These solutions are discussed in Section II. Not all commentators consider this phenomenon problematic. For
articles endorsing multijurisdictional litigation, see Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclu-
sion in Merger Litigation, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 1053 (2013); Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of
Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 57 (2009); for articles viewing it as problemat-
ic, see John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 Ind. L.J. 1345 (2012); Benjamin D. Landry, Mutual
Assent in the Corporate Contract: Forum Selection Bylaws, 18 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1 (2013); Micheletti &
Parker, supra note 1; Myers, supra note 3; Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed
Complaint, 69 Bus. Law. 1 (2013--2014).
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adopting (or not adopting) the provision. It would also shed light on whether this pri-
vate ordering solution obviates the need for judicial or legislative intervention. Using
hand-collected data on all 746 U.S. public corporations that have adopted the provision
(as of August 2014),5 we analyze the extent to which adoption is associated with a firm’s
internal governance structure versus its external influences (such as outside counsel).
Throughout the analysis, we draw a distinction between firms that have the provi-
sion at the time of their IPO (IPO adopters) and those that have adopted a provision
after their IPO (midstream adopters). The dynamics of adoption at these two stages dif-
fer considerably. When adoption occurs before the IPO, any potential wealth effect can
be impounded into the stock price before public investors purchase their shares. In con-
trast, when adoption occurs after the IPO, public shareholders have no such opportuni-
ty to price-in the potential wealth effect. If the value of the provision were negative,
then midstream adoption could generate a loss for shareholders. Thus, in contrast to
provisions in place at the IPO, post-IPO amendments to corporate documents (often
referred to as “latecomer terms”)6 could transfer wealth from shareholders to manage-
ment (or vice versa). For this reason, we use different empirical strategies to analyze
IPO and midstream adoption.
Our analysis of IPO adoption yields two principal results. First, adoption is
approaching universality as from January 2010 to August 2014, the rate of adoption of
Delaware IPOs has risen steadily from 0 to 80 percent. Second, company-specific charac-
teristics, such as industry or firm size, play little to no role in the adoption decision.
Instead, we find that the most significant predictor of IPO adoption is having outside
counsel who has previously advised an IPO adopter. That is, the data fit a model in
which law firms abruptly switch from never adopting to always adopting the provision.
Although we identify a similar adoption pattern for investment banks underwriting the
issues, when their role is analyzed jointly with law firms, only the law firm light-switch
effect remains. These results are consistent with the characterization that law firms
make a once-and-for-all decision to unconditionally advise their corporate clients to
adopt an exclusive forum provision before going public.
Our analysis of midstream adoption yields two related results. First, there are mini-
mal to no differences in corporate governance between adopters and nonadopters. Fur-
ther, when there is a significant difference, it is adopters that have “better” governance
5The first exclusive forum bylaw in our sample was adopted by Oracle Corp. in 2006. The first exclusive forum
charter provision included in the certificate of a company on going public (IPO firm) was adopted by Netsuite
Inc. in 2007. Three corporations adopted exclusive forum provisions in the 1990s that went largely unheralded,
and so, as Joseph Grundfest puts it, they were “evolutionary deadends,” and, in fact, two of those companies
removed the clauses in the past decade. Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate
Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. 333, 352 (2012). Grundfest further describes
the evolution of the language of the clauses, which followed two templates distinguished by whether the board
can waive a clause’s application; the elective version---which is the type of provision that he drafted for Netsuite---
has quickly come to predominate over the nonwaivable form of the earliest provisions drafted in the 1990s. Id.
6The phrase was coined by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel to emphasize the differential wealth effect of
midstream charter changes from terms in place at the initiation of an investment. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, 1442--43 (1989).
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(at least according to what institutional investors and proxy advisors deem good gover-
nance). These findings are at odds with claims, made by those same investors and advi-
sory services, that the provisions are adverse to shareholder interests; if they were
adverse to shareholder interests, then well-governed firms would not adopt them. Sec-
ond, we find no significant differences in governance characteristics between firms
whose adoption was implemented by the board of directors versus those whose adoption
was approved by shareholders. These findings should allay the concern that midstream
adoption harms shareholders. Indeed, as midstream adopters are at least as likely as
nonadopters to have mechanisms of good governance that are thought to reduce mana-
gerial opportunism, the more plausible characterization is that such provisions are, if
anything, beneficial to shareholders.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes the literature on
multijurisdictional litigation and exclusive forum provisions. The third section describes
the dataset. The fourth section presents our methodology and results, separately for
IPO and midstream adopters. The final section concludes.
II. Multijurisdictional Shareholder Litigation
and the Exclusive Forum Solution
The first part of this section provides an overview of the research documenting the
sharp increase in multijurisdictional litigation over the past decade, why this is thought
to be a problem, and proposed solutions. In the second part, we review the empirical
research on exclusive forum provisions.
A. Multijurisdictional Shareholder Litigation
Multijurisdictional litigation is a state court phenomenon. This is because there is no
formal mechanism, as there is in the federal system, to consolidate lawsuits that involve
the same transaction into one forum. The phenomenon is also a relatively recent one,
at least in the corporate law context, as there has been a striking shift in shareholder
lawsuit filings over the past decade. In 2000, most complaints brought against Delaware
corporations were filed solely in Delaware, but by 2010 over half the lawsuits against Del-
aware corporations were brought in multiple forums, and less than a third were filed
solely in Delaware, with a similar proportion filed solely out of state.7 Most of these law-
suits involve mergers and acquisitions (M&As).8 At the same time as plaintiffs have been
7E.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 374 (of Delaware corporation M&A cases filed in 2010, “8 percent were single,
out-of-state filings; 23 percent were Delaware-only filings; and 58 percent were multiple filings . . . in Delaware
and out of state”); Armour et al., Losing, supra note 1, at 625, 627 (proportion of Delaware corporation LBO
cases filed in Delaware dropped from over 70 percent in 2000 to less than half from 2006 onward).
8Johnson, supra note 1, at 371 (state securities class action filings 1997--2010); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S.
Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133, 167--69 (2004) (sample of all Delaware
cases filed over 1999--2000).
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filing in more numerous venues, the proportion of M&As attracting litigation has also
spiked dramatically.9
Commentators have advanced a number of explanations for the acceleration of
multiforum litigation since 2002. Some have emphasized decisions of the Delaware
Chancery Court that sharply criticized and reduced requested attorney fees, along with
its relaxation of the presumption granting lead-counsel status to the lawyer who is “first
to file.”10 Others have characterized the development as an aftereffect of changes in
plaintiffs’ law firm competition wrought by (1) the 1995 Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA), which made securities lawsuits more costly for small law firms,
and (2) the 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which pre-
empted private state securities, but not fiduciary, actions, along with (3) the breakup of
the then leading plaintiffs’ law firms, which are said to have served a coordinating func-
tion for law firms’ fee sharing within one court filing.11
The explanation concerning changes in law firm competition would affect litiga-
tion against firms incorporated in any state and not simply Delaware, however. And not
surprisingly, the trend of increased corporate litigation, particularly acquisitive transac-
tion litigation, as well as the trend of increased filings in multiple jurisdictions, has been
experienced by firms across the states, that is, by non-Delaware firms incorporated in
states other than their headquarters state, as well as by Delaware corporations.12 Accord-
ingly, while the vast majority of firms adopting exclusive forum clauses are Delaware cor-
porations, a number of firms incorporated in other states have also adopted such
provisions (7 percent of the firms in our sample; see Table 1, Panel A). The increased
prevalence of such clauses has been attributed as a possible cause of a recent drop in
9Johnson, supra note 1, at 379; Armour et al., Losing, supra note 1, at 621 (of 25 largest M&A transactions each
year over 1994--2010, ratio of suits to deals rose from 1:1 in 2006 to 2:1 in 2009, with virtually all Delaware trans-
actions attracting litigation by 2008, and multiple jurisdiction filings simultaneously increasing); Matthew D. Cain
& Stephen Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014, at 1--2 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com.
abstract:256790 (lawsuits brought in over 90 percent of corporate takeovers in 2014 compared to 39 percent in
2005, and 34 percent of 2014 deals experienced suits in multiple states compared to 8 percent in 2005). This
trend appears to have slowed in 2014, when for the first time since 2009, the number of cases brought in one
court exceeded the number brought in more than one forum. Cornerstone Research, Shareholder Litigation
Involving Acquisitions of Public Companies: Review of 2014 M&A Litigation 3 (2015).
10Armour et al., Losing, supra note 1, at 643--45, 651; Johnson, supra note 1, at 384. Cain and Davidoff provide data
suggesting that plaintiffs’ attorney filings are inversely correlated with dismissal rates and, in some models, positively cor-
related with the size of fee awards, and that states would appear to be actively involved in the process, responding to
declines (increases) in the number of suits filed by adjusting fee awards upward (downward). Matthew D. Cain & Steven
Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 130--34 (2015).
11Johnson, supra note 1, at 350, 361; Boris Feldman, Shareholder Litigation After the Fall of the Iron Curtain, 45
Rev. Sec. & Commod. Reg. 7 (2012); Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation
of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 427, 429--32 (2012).
12Armour et al., Losing, supra note 1, at 614, 623--24, 635; Myers, supra note 3, at 470, 482, 485. Myers also notes
that multijurisdictional litigation has affected firms incorporated in their headquarter state through increases in
parallel federal court filings. Id. at 487--88. Myers therefore contends that it is a mistake to characterize the multi-
jurisdictional trend as unique to Delaware firms and, given his data on option backdating cases, as unique to
M&A litigation. Id. at 470, 479.
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the number of acquisitive transaction lawsuits filed in multiple courts and a correspond-
ing rise in those brought solely in Delaware.13
Multiforum litigation is thought to be problematic for four key reasons. First, multiple
suits entail duplicative litigation costs and waste judicial resources. These costs are ultimately
borne by shareholders and the general public.14 Second, plaintiffs (or, more accurately, their
attorneys) are said to seek out courts that will rule more favorably on a complaint, or award
greater attorney fees than would the Delaware Chancery Court. This would be a particularly
worrisome type of forum shopping because, given that the same substantive law is supposed
to be applied, neither the outcome nor the fee award should, in theory, vary by forum.15
Third, multiforum litigation is said potentially to generate a “reverse auction,” in which
defendants are believed to settle with the plaintiff who will accept the lowest payment.16
This would be equally troubling forum shopping as it would distort or even
eliminate the relationship between the merits of a suit and its settlement value.
Finally, multiforum litigation undermines a state’s ability to control the
development of its corporate law, for when a lawsuit is filed out of state, its law can be
determined by another state’s court, potentially producing inconsistent rulings, there-
by increasing legal uncertainty and operating costs for the state’s domestic
corporations.17
Commentators critical of multiforum litigation have advanced a number of solu-
tions. These proposals have focused on three approaches to resolution: legislative, judi-
cial, and private ordering. Advocates of the legislative approach have proposed that
Congress federalize the forum by preempting state corporate litigation (paralleling
SLUSA) or mandate that lawsuits be brought solely in the corporation’s statutory
13Cornerstone Research, supra note 9, at 3.
14E.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 381.
15E.g., Myers, supra note 3, at 495. There are also procedural differences across states, which will follow the law
of the forum rather than the statutory domicile (in contrast to whose law governs the substantive legal issues),
and which plaintiffs could seek to exploit to their advantage, such as the extent of discovery permitted, the
approach to the holding of hearings on, and granting of, preliminary injunctions, the criteria for selecting lead
counsel, and were the case to be litigated, the trier being a jury rather than a chancery court judge. Id. at 494.
16E.g., Griffith & Lahav, supra note 4, at 1082--83; Johnson, supra note 1, at 382. Although Griffith and Lahav
identify this negative potential of multiforum litigation, they contend that the phenomenon should be perceived
as a benefit and not a problem, by creating a market for preclusion of claims, which improves litigation outcomes
by performing a price discovery mechanism and relieving Delaware courts from having to hear every dispute.
They further contend that the appropriate solution to the problem of attorney opportunism in this context is to
make the market function better, by enhanced judicial oversight of complaints and settlements and improved
intercourt communication about multiple lawsuits rather than eliminate it by centralizing claims in one court. Id.
at 1057--58, 1102, 1115, 1125, 1138.
17To the extent that the vast majority of these cases settle, conflict from a substantive decision by a foreign court
is less likely than discrepancies in the nature of the settlement, and attorney fees, that the foreign court accepts,
compared to the domestic court.
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domicile.18 A related legislative approach would compel federal courts to stay sharehold-
er lawsuits in favor of filings in the statutory domicile, along with permitting their
removal from an out-of-state court to federal court so as to be routed back to the domi-
cile state through a thereupon-imposed stay.19
Courts confronted with multijurisdiction lawsuits have attempted to fashion a
solution that relies on voluntary coordination—acts of judicial “comity”—that identi-
fy which court is to take charge of the litigation and can be initiated by either the
courts or the parties.20 Defense motions, referred to as Savitt motions after the
attorney initiating them, are a more polite and respectful mechanism to obtain a
single forum than a conventional motion to dismiss a suit in favor of a proceeding
filed elsewhere because the moving attorney does not express a preference among
courts.
The clear-cut advantage of comity techniques over proposals for preemptive feder-
al legislation is that they require no input beyond the judges and parties to a specific
lawsuit. But such techniques have an inherent drawback as they cannot resolve multifo-
rum litigation if the judges cannot agree on who should hear a case.21 Commentators
have accordingly advocated alternative mechanisms to ensure coordination among state
courts without resort to federal legislation, such as revising the criteria used for forum
selection under current conflict of laws doctrine or drafting model legislation for states
to adopt.22 In contrast to the comity solution, such proposals have the disadvantage of
requiring the affirmative decision of numerous actors (e.g., approval at the multiple
stages of the ALI’s restatement revision process, along with acceptance by state courts,
18E.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 385--86 (noting possible solution); Comm. on Sec. Litig., N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Coor-
dinating Related Securities Litigation: A Position Paper (2008) (recommending as solution) [hereinafter NYC
Bar Paper]; Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1809--10 (noting possible solution and rejecting as undesir-
able, as well as unlikely to occur).
19Myers, supra note 3, at 472.
20For example, when multijurisdictional litigation initially appeared on the scene, the Chancellor of the Delaware
Chancery Court advanced such a comity approach, reaching out to other courts on his own accord, without liti-
gant prompting, to negotiate which court would hear the case, an initiative that would appear to have functioned
effectively. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3, at 1804; In re Allion Healthcare Shareholders Litig., 2011 WL
1135016 at *4 n.12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (Ch. Chandler) (stating that judges’ conferring on where a case
should proceed “is a method that has worked for me in every instance when it was tried”).
21In one well-known instance, the New York and Delaware courts refused to cede jurisdiction. See In re Topps
Co. Shareholders Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying defendants’ motion to stay court’s ruling on pre-
liminary injunction motion to avoid having to litigate in two courts); Matter of Topps Co. Shareholder Litig., 200
N.Y. Slip Op. 52543(U), 19 Misc.3d 1103(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
or stay the proceeding because, among other reasons, New York case was filed first), available at: http://law.jus-
tia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2007/2007-52543.html. The claims were ultimately resolved in the Delaware
proceeding after the New York appellate court stayed the New York action. Myers, supra note 3, at 520.
22Strine et al., supra note 4 (proposing prioritizing the statutory domicile over other factors, along with further
revisions to the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Conflicts of Law); Thomas & Thompson, supra note 3,
at 1810--11 (suggesting that the American Bar Association committee that crafts the Model Business Corporation
Act could draft a legislative template for model act states that provides a coordinated solution).
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or by a drafting committee(s) and 50 state legislatures), and thus entail a time-
consuming process with an uncertain outcome.
The implementation difficulties in judicial and legislative approaches to resolving
multiforum legislation lent force to commentators advocating the “self-help” private
ordering solution of exclusive forum provisions that automatically coordinate across
courts by identifying the forum ex ante. However, the key to the effectiveness of such a
strategy is the provisions’ enforceability, a matter on which commentators differed when
the approach was initially proposed by practitioners in the late 2000s.23 Given such legal
uncertainty, few firms adopted the provisions until the strategy was approvingly noted by
Vice Chancellor Travis Laster, in dicta in a 2010 opinion, In re Revlon Shareholders Litiga-
tion, in which he remarked that corporations could adopt exclusive forum charter provi-
sions to manage multijurisdictional litigation.24
Though Revlon’s dicta only referred to exclusive forum charter provisions, after
the decision, numerous firms adopted exclusive forum bylaw provisions. Those
adoptions came to a virtual standstill, however, when, following the refusal of a federal
court in California (in Galaviz v. Berg) to enforce a bylaw (which had been adopted
after the litigation had commenced and would thereby be applied retroactively),25
several shareholder lawsuits were filed that challenged management-adopted bylaws as
invalid under Delaware law. Although most of the sued corporations voluntarily
repealed their bylaws, two chose to litigate. In a 2013 decision, Boilermakers Local 154
Retirement Fund v. Chevron, the Chancery Court upheld the validity of exclusive forum
bylaw provisions, rejecting the plaintiffs’ statutory and contractual contentions that,
under Delaware law, management could not preempt shareholders’ right to select a
forum.26
Following the Chevron decision, corporate adoptions of exclusive forum bylaws rap-
idly accelerated, paralleling the widespread inclusion of such provisions in IPO charters
(which had not been impacted by the bylaw litigation).27 Of course, for exclusive forum
23E.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions:
A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 Bus. Law. 325 (2013) (enforceable); Thomas & Thompson, supra
note 3 (not enforceable).
24In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) [hereinafter Revlon]. The trend of
increasing adoptions of forum selection provisions after this decision and the Chevron decision of then Chancel-
lor Strine, cited in note 26, is discussed in Sections II.B and IV.
25Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp.2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2011) [hereinafter Galaviz].
26Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del Ch. 2013) [hereinafter Chevron]; see
Claudia H. Allen, Trends in Exclusive Forum Bylaws, Conference Board Director Notes 2 (2014) [hereinafter
Allen 2014], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract52411715 (10 of 12 companies repealed bylaws when sued).
Apparently wishing to avoid a Supreme Court affirmance that might have been even broader than that of the
Chancery Court, the decision was not appealed. Theodore N. Mirvis et al., Surrender in the Forum Selection
Bylaw Battle, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Oct. 25, 2013). The decision did include a caveat that even a valid
bylaw could still be challenged as operating inequitably, indicating that the provisions could be subject to a case-
by-case review of the reasonableness of their operation. Chevron, supra.
27See Allen 2014, supra note 26, and Figure 2 and accompanying discussion in Section IV.
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provisions to be effective, state courts other than the Delaware Chancery Court must
also respect their validity. In contrast to the earlier federal court decision, they have
overwhelmingly done so: numerous state courts, including one in California, ruling on
the issue after Chevron have dismissed suits before them in accordance with the forum
choice expressed in the defendant corporations’ documents.28 Accordingly, of the three
potential routes for reducing the likelihood of multijurisdictional litigation—legislative,
judicial, and private ordering—the self-help solution has decisively emerged as the most
promising, as it is by far the simplest to implement and has been effective in resolving
multiforum litigation. The three routes are not, however, mutually exclusive. For
instance, Virginia adopted legislation permitting domestic corporations to adopt a bylaw
designating Virginia or their headquarters state as an exclusive forum for shareholder
litigation, and, more recently, so did Delaware.29
B. Prior Empirical Literature on Exclusive Forum Provisions
The first studies examining firms’ adoption of exclusive forum clauses, by Claudia Allen
and Joseph Grundfest, focused almost exclusively on the number and type of provisions
adopted, rather than on the characteristics of adopting firms.30 Describing a rapidly
increasing number of firms adopting the provisions, they report that most provisions
are in charters of newly incorporated firms, while bylaw amendments are the mecha-
nism of the vast majority of midstream adoptions.31 More importantly, they characterize
exclusive forum provisions as a “Delaware phenomenon” because all of the several
28Glen T. Schleyer et al., Exclusive Forum Bylaws Gain Momentum, Del. Corp. & Leg. Serv. Blog (July 8, 2014)
(all state courts considering enforceability of exclusive forum bylaws have upheld them, including courts in Cali-
fornia, New York, Illinois, and Louisiana), available at http://decals.delaware.gov/2014/07/08/exclusive-forum-
bylaws-gain-momentum/. A federal court in California has also enforced a Delaware exclusive forum bylaw, con-
trary to the earlier decision. In re CytRx Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., No. 2:14-cv-06414-GHK-PJW (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 2015) (dismissing lawsuit on grounds of corporation’s valid exclusive forum clause and that Delaware
Chancery Court was adequate alternative forum for the dispute).
29Hunton & Williams Client Alert, 2015 Amendments to the Virginia Stock Corporation Act (Apr. 2015) (House
Bill 1878, which, among other provisions, amends V.S.C.A. § 13.1-624 to confirm that corporations can adopt
exclusive forum bylaws, was signed by the governor, with an effective date of July 1, 2015); D.G.C.L. § 115 (effec-
tive Aug. 1, 2015). One firm in our sample is incorporated in Virginia, a 2013 midstream bylaw adopter, which
designated as the exclusive forum the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, or the state Circuit
Court of Fairfax County, if the federal court lacked jurisdiction. Albemarle Corp, Form 10-Q, filed Oct. 18, 2013.
30Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters and Bylaws i, iv (2010 2011) (first
published July 1, 2010, updated Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Allen 2011]; Claudia H. Allen, Study of
Delaware Forum Selection in Charters and Bylaws (2010, 2012) (first published July 1, 2010, updated Apr.
7, 2011, updated Jan. 2012) [hereinafter Allen 2012]; Allen 2014, supra note 26; Grundfest, supra note 5,
at 352.
31As discussed in Section III, this dichotomy is still the case. They also note the steady increase to domi-
nance of elective forum clauses over time. Grundfest, supra note 5, at 363, 365 66; Allen, 2012, supra note
30, at 7 8.
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hundred provisions in their studies select Delaware as the exclusive forum state.32 In
addition, both Allen and Grundfest call to attention the fact that a large number of
adopters are located in California, a tendency Grundfest associates with a view that
California-headquartered firms are likely to “disproportionately” be sued and that the
business community believes California courts to be of “lower quality” than Delaware
courts.33
Finally, both discuss the small number of firms that at the time had put
adoption of a clause to a shareholder vote (two of which failed). Allen suggests the out-
comes can be explained by opposition to exclusive forum clauses of the leading proxy
advisory service, Institutional Investor Services (ISS), whose recommendations are
routinely followed by many institutional investors,34 and the extent of insider sharehold-
ings.35 Grundfest explicitly calculates the inside ownership (combining management and
outside blockholders’ shares) of these firms and, paralleling Allen’s observation, he notes
32The phrase is Grundfest’s. Grundfest, supra note 5, at 367. Allen only examines Delaware forum provisions
and all the firms in Grundfest’s sample selected Delaware, including three firms not incorporated in Dela-
ware. As discussed in Section III, we also find that the vast majority of adopters are Delaware firms, includ-
ing all IPO adopters, but the exclusiveness of the phenomenon as a Delaware one has diminished: we find
that 8 percent of midstream adopters are non-Delaware firms selecting non-Delaware forums. Moreover,
although excluded from our analysis, there are numerous mutual funds and unincorporated entities with
exclusive forum provisions, and a large number are not Delaware firms and do not choose a Delaware
forum.
33Allen 2011, supra note 30, at ii; Allen 2012, supra note 30, at 2; Allen 14, supra note 26, at 6; Grundfest, supra
note 5, at 368--69. Grundfest describes the adoption of the provisions as a “general migration to Delaware . . . and
a particular emigration from California” because in his dataset, 32 percent of Delaware adopters are located in
California, but only 24 percent of Delaware corporations are located in California. In contrast, we show in Sec-
tion IV.A that, in all likelihood, there is no “California effect,” at least for IPO firms over a longer timeframe
than he studies. In addition to domicile (Delaware) and location (particularly California), Allen identifies adopt-
ers’ industry (largest sector is manufacturing) and size (few S&P 500 firms). Allen 2011, supra note 30, at vi;
Allen 2012, supra note 30, at 1, 2; Allen 2014, supra note 26, at 6.
34Studies have estimated that between 10--20 percent of voting shares follow the leading proxy advisory service
firm’s recommendations. E.g., Cindy R. Alexander et al., Interim News and the Role of Proxy Voting Advice, 23
Rev. Fin. Stud. 4419 (2010) (proxy advisor recommendation in favor of dissidents in contested elections increases
probability of their success between 14--30 percent); Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. Fin. 2389 (2004)
(directors for whom proxy advisors recommend withholding votes receive 19 percent fewer votes); Stephen Choi
et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality? 59 Emory L.J. 869 (2010) (proxy advisor recommendations
to withhold votes for directors shift 6--10 percent of votes). Yonca Ertimur et al., Understanding Uncontested
Director Elections: Determinants and Consequences (2014), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract52447920 (ISS
withholdvote recommendation for a director’s election is associated with approximately 20 percent more votes
withheld). ISS’s position on exclusive forum clauses was in sync with the view of many institutional investors. See
Council of Institutional Investors, Policies on Corporate Governance, available at: http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_
policies (“1.9. Judicial Forum: Companies should not attempt to restrict the venue for shareholder claims by
adopting charter or bylaw provisions that seek to establish an exclusive forum.”).
35Allen 2012, supra note 30, at 5, 11 (suggesting that inside ownership levels were unrepresentatively high for two
firms with successful votes and that failures affected by ISS). ISS took the position that it would recommend voting
against an exclusive forum proposal if the company did not have four “best practice” corporate governance fea-
tures: annual election and majority voting of directors, no poison pill unless approved by shareholders, and a
“meaningful” right of shareholders to call special meetings. Id at. 5. The latter requirement was dropped when it
refined its position in the fall of 2011 and stated it would make recommendations on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 6.
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that inside ownership was lower in the two firms whose proposals were not approved than
in those whose proposals were approved (under 15 percent compared to a range of 20–87
percent).36 He plausibly characterizes the data as suggesting that voting outcomes will be
correlated with inside ownership. In contrast, we disaggregate insider and outside block-
holder share ownership in Section IV.B and find that insiders hold considerably less
shares than the combined figures in Grundfest’s study would suggest. We further find
that the average inside ownership of voting firms decreases over time, while the propor-
tion of approved proposals increases, suggesting that there is an increase over time in
shareholders’ familiarity with the provisions. In keeping with such a hypothesis, the lead-
ing advisor, ISS, has substantially modified its opposition, albeit not expressly approving
the clauses.37 The shift may reflect a recognition by ISS that a number of its clientele of
institutional investors no longer view the clauses unfavorably.38
The Allen and Grundfest examinations of forum selection clause adoptions are
useful introductions to the phenomenon—in particular, identifying an accelerating
trend of adoption and differential routes followed by new and established firms—but
without more information on the characteristics of adopters compared with nonadop-
ters, or among adopters using different methods (board-adopted vs. shareholder-
approved provisions), it is not possible to ascertain the significance of the phenomenon
or whether the rapid pace of adoptions, particularly by midstream bylaws, should be an
issue of any moment for shareholders. It matters whether these are, for instance, typical
firms, firms uniquely prone to litigation, or firms led by entrenched executives.
In a recent paper, Jared Wilson undertakes an event study, analyzing stock price
reactions to exclusive forum provision adoptions, seeking to answer a key question not
addressed by Allen and Grundfest: What are the clauses’ welfare effects?39 He finds that
upon the adoption’s announcement, firms experience a small positive price effect of 0.8
percent that is statistically significant.40 Subdividing the adopters into those more and less
36Grundfest, supra note 5, at 371.
37For the 2015 proxy season, ISS further adjusted its position to recommend shareholders withhold their vote from
directors who adopt bylaws “materially adverse” to shareholders, while taking a case-by-case approach to bylaws
“generally deemed not ‘materially adverse,’” which entails examining additional factors, such as the timing of adop-
tion, and it identified exclusive forum provisions as falling into the category of “generally not materially adverse”
bylaws. Andrew R. Brownstein & Sebastian V. Niles, ISS Clarifies 2015 Voting Policies Regarding Proxy Access,
Excluding Shareholder Proposals and “Unilaterally” Adopting Bylaw and Charter Amendments (Feb. 20, 2015).
38See, e.g., Allen 2014, supra note 26, at 8 (noting some institutional investors, such as T. Rowe Price, that
“originally opposed exclusive forum provisions have changed or softened their views”).
39Jared I. Wilson, The Value of Venue in Corporate Litigation: Evidence from Exclusive Forum Provisions (Aug.
2015), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract52646312. Wilson also examines stock returns around the Chevron
decision. Because that analysis includes non-Delaware firms, which the decision did not directly impact, without
providing a breakout of their proportion across variously examined subsamples, we think there is considerable
noise in the return estimation and we do not discuss it.
40Id. at 21, 43. When subdivided by whether the firms experienced a bid before adoption of a provision, the
returns are insignificantly positive and not significantly different across the groups. Id. at 43. He provides two rea-
sons why the positive stock price returns are not explained by a signaling effect, that is, they are not due to the
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likely to be subject to be acquired, and hence more and less likely to be subject to multifo-
rum shareholder litigation, he further finds that the announcement returns of firms with a
higher probability of takeover are both higher and statistically significant, at 1.3 percent,
compared to those with a lower probability (0.41 percent).41 He finds a similarly stark dif-
ference in returns subdividing firms by whether they become takeover targets in the future:
firms that receive a bid have higher and significantly positive returns of 6.8 percent upon
announcement of adoption, compared to those that do not (0.45 percent).42 These data
are consistent with the view in the literature that exclusive forum provisions benefit share-
holders by reducing duplicative litigation costs.
Wilson also seeks to explain which firms adopt exclusive forum provisions by firm
characteristics, including several governance features related to board independence
and institutional ownership, and the aforementioned takeover variables.43 He finds that
adoption is positively related to firm size and past and future takeover bids (takeover
probability is only marginally significant), and negatively related to prior stock perfor-
mance.44 None of the governance characteristics are significant.45 Thus he plausibly
concludes that firms that are more likely to experience multiforum litigation (given the
significance of the takeover variables) are more likely to adopt the provisions.
Wilson provides a valuable contribution to our understanding of the working of
exclusive forum provisions and whether they benefit shareholders and not solely manag-
ers. However, there is a limit to the value added of his analysis of which firms adopt the
market interpreting adoption of an exclusive forum clause as new information indicating the probability of the
firm receiving a bid. First, he separately examines the stock price effect for firms that experienced a withdrawn
bid before adoption, contending that for these firms the announcement effect is not likely to be confounded
with unanticipated information about future bids. He finds that these firms experience a similar positive price
effect (albeit insignificant, which is likely due to the small sample size). Id. at 23. Second, he contends that the
event study of the Chevron decision is not subject to these firm-specific concerns, and that the results of that anal-
ysis are consistent with the provisions having a positive effect independent of a signal. Id.
41Wilson also divides firms into the likelihood of experiencing federal securities litigation or making an acquisi-
tion, along with experience of such events before and after adoption. We do not discuss these results because
federal securities actions are not covered by exclusive forum clauses and less than one-third of such actions are
accompanied by derivative claims. Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1749, 1774, 1778 (2010) (30 percent of federal securities actions accompanied by
state actions). In addition, there are exceedingly few transactions in which shareholders of an acquirer of another
company could state a fiduciary claim (and the data used to predict and identify acquisitions include all acquisi-
tions, not only those in which there might be a claim, such as a related-party transaction). However, as there are
no clear proxies for shareholder litigation, we use one of the federal securities litigation predictive indicators
(industry classification) in our analysis as a robustness check in Section IV.B.
42Wilson, supra note 39, at 22.
43The governance variables included are the percentage of independent directors, the percentage appointed
after the CEO’s appointment, the percentage of directors who serve on at least three other public company
boards, the separation of the CEO and chairman positions, the presence of institutional blockholders, and the
percentage of shares held by institutions.
44Id. at 39--41 (Table 3). The three takeover variables are entered into three separate regressions.
45Id.
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provisions, which muddies the interpretation of who benefits, because it combines IPO
and midstream adopters, as well as midstream adoptions by bylaw and by shareholder
vote.46 Yet the core difference for public shareholders in the timing of adoption (investors
in IPOs can adjust for a provision’s presence in the purchase price) as well as the mode
of midstream adoption (bylaws do not require shareholder approval) suggests not only
that the factors driving adoption could well differ in these contexts, but also that the key
questions for assessing the benefits differ depending on the adoption process. According-
ly, it is essential that the empirical analysis distinguish across the forms of adoption.
III. Data
Our data consist of three samples: (1) companies that have adopted an exclusive forum
clause, (2) initial public offerings, and (3) a control group of companies that have not
adopted an exclusive forum clause. After explaining the construction of each dataset,
we discuss key summary statistics of each in turn.
A. Dataset Construction
The first dataset is our population of interest: all U.S-domiciled public corporations that
have adopted an exclusive forum clause. These include both corporations that adopted
before their IPO (IPO adopters) and those adopting after their IPO (midstream adopt-
ers). We constructed the dataset by searching the SEC EDGAR database for all instances
in which the terms “exclusive” and “forum” appear in the same sentence in either a bylaw
or a charter.47 In practice, our search was overinclusive, and so we read through each
bylaw or charter to confirm that it contained an exclusive forum clause and that the issuer
was a U.S. public corporation. It is possible that our search did not recover every exclusive
forum clause ever adopted. However, given our study of the phrasing of the clauses, we
are confident that our sample contains virtually all exclusive forum clauses adopted before
August 14, 2014 by U.S.-domiciled corporations that report to the SEC.
The second dataset is a comparison group for IPO adopters. We collected data on
all IPOs from January 2010 to August 2014. We commenced the data collection in 2010
because only one exclusive forum clause was included in an IPO charter before that
year. We restricted the sample to IPOs by U.S.-domiciled corporations that report to the
SEC (i.e., the same sample for which we hand-collected the exclusive forum provision
data). Our data on the firms are of three types: (1) identification and financial variables
such as firm name, firm size, and IPO proceeds, (2) the name of the law firm that
46While his sample period extends beyond ours to December 2014, because of limits to the dataset he uses to
identify firm characteristics, his analysis includes only 58 IPO and 324 midstream adoptions.
47Specifically, we searched for “exclusive /S forum” on the Bloomberg Law EDGAR search tool and limited the
search to “Exhibit 3” (bylaws and charters). We also conducted a similar search of proxy statements in Lexis to
identify provisions subjected to a vote. This search picked up a few additional firms that did not file an exhibit
containing the provision.
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advised the company during its IPO, and (3) corporate governance variables such as
state of incorporation and whether the board was classified at the time of the IPO. The
IPO-related data come from the SDC Platinum database maintained by Thomson Reu-
ters. The governance data were obtained from the firms’ SEC filings in the EDGAR
database.
The third and final dataset is a comparison group for midstream adopters. We
used an algorithm to match each midstream non-event-driven bylaw adopter to a similar
corporation that had not adopted an exclusive forum clause. The algorithm matched
companies by year, firm size, industry, and domicile.48 We then hand-collected corpo-
rate governance and ownership data for each midstream adopter and its matched nona-
dopter from SEC filings in EDGAR at the time of adoption.
B. Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics. The data are split into four panels, each represent-
ing a different unit of analysis: Panel A—all exclusive forum clauses, Panel B—IPOs
between 2010–2014, Panel C—law firms advising IPOs, and Panel D—exclusive forum
clauses adopted midstream.
Panel A of Table 1 considers all 746 exclusive forum clauses adopted by U.S.-
domiciled public corporations. Of these, 93 percent specify Delaware as the exclusive
forum. The 746 instances of adoption are split roughly 50/50 between IPO adopters
and midstream adopters. Panel A also shows that exclusive forum clauses are a quite
recent phenomenon: over 70 percent of existing provisions were adopted in the last two
years of the sample (the two years prior to August 2014). Only 4 percent were adopted
before 2011.
Panel B of Table 1 presents data on all IPOs of U.S.-domiciled corporations
between January 2010 and August 2014 in the SDC database. There are 679 IPOs in
total; 45 percent had an exclusive forum clause in the charter, 76 percent were Delaware
corporations, and 25 percent (the plurality) were headquartered in California.49 Of the
Delaware IPOs, 59 percent have a forum clause. The vast majority of the clauses (83 per-
cent) are elective (i.e., they permit the board to waive the application of the clause).
48See the Appendix for details of the matching procedure. Size and industry are standard characteristics used in
the literature to identify comparable companies. A further rationale arguably also informs our use: both size and
industry are key factors the literature identifies with litigation risk; see, e.g., Armour et al., Losing, supra note 1
(acquisition target’s size related to litigation); Irene Kim & Douglas J. Skinner, Measuring Securities Litigation
Risk, 53 J. Acctng & Econ. 290 (2012) (size and industry related to federal securities litigation); Roberta Romano,
The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation? 7 J. Law Econ. & Org. 55, 58 (1991) (size related to share-
holder litigation). It is desirable in our context to match on proxies for litigation risk to reduce the possibility of
bias in the comparison to the extent that litigation risk is a factor in the decision to adopt a clause, although, as
noted earlier (note 41), securities lawsuits, from which the industry litigation risk factors are derived, are not
strongly correlated with corporate-law-related lawsuits.
49We identified a total of 351 IPO firms with exclusive forum clauses in our EDGAR search, as indicated in Panel
A. Thirty-two of those IPOs were corporate spinoffs, a transaction type not included in the SDC IPO database. An
additional 13 of the IPO firms identified in our search were also not in the SDC database. Those 45 firms are
excluded from the counts in Panel C and our analysis of IPO forum selection clause adoptions in Section IV.
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Most IPOs generated more than $50 million in proceeds and most were by corporations
with over $100 million in assets (68 and 58 percent, respectively).
In Panel C of Table 1 the unit of analysis is the law firm. The panel includes all
law firms that have advised at least one of the 679 IPOs from January 2010 to August
2014 (i.e., the sample of IPOs in Panel B). There are 183 unique law firms in total. The
average number of IPOs per law firm is 3.7 (679 IPOs/183 law firms), but the distribu-
tion is skewed. Of the 183 total law firms, about half have advised only one IPO since
January 2010. One-third of law firms have advised between two and four IPOs; 10 per-
cent have advised between five and nine IPOs; and 8 percent (15 law firms) have
advised more than 10 IPOs.
The distribution of exclusive forum clauses per law firm is commensurately
skewed. More than half of all law firms (61 percent) have never adopted an exclusive
forum clause at the IPO; 16 percent have adopted it exactly once; 10 percent have
adopted it two or three times; and 13 percent have adopted it four or more times. In
addition, the first IPO after Revlon of 31 law firms (17 percent) contained a provision.
Such firms can be characterized as legal “innovators.”
Table 1 also presents summary data on law firm characteristics that would be rele-
vant to a law firm’s propensity to use an exclusive forum provision: sophistication and
pre-Revlon experience with large M&A transactions (as larger deals are frequent targets
of multiforum litigation).50 We proxy for firms’ sophistication by the rankings in the
Am Law 100 (gross revenue) and the Legal 500 series (elite expertise).51 Less than one-
third of the firms (27 percent) were in the elite tiers of advisors to issuers of equity
offerings and large M&A transactions and only slightly more (37 percent) are in the top
50E.g., Robert Borowski, Combatting Multiforum Shareholder Litigation: A Federal Acceptance of Forum Selec-
tion Bylaws, 44 Sw L.R. 149, 150 (2014) (in 2012, 93 percent of deals over $100 million and 96 percent of deals
over $500 million were subject to shareholder litigation, over half of which were brought in multiple states).
M&A experience is constructed by extracting from Thompson-Reuters’ SDC M&A dataset all completed, uncondi-
tional M&As of U.S. publicly traded corporations whose deal value was at least $100 million, with an announce-
ment date from Jan.1, 2005 to the Revlon decision. Creditor acquisitions of a bankrupt firm, recapitalizations,
spinoffs, repurchases, and purchases of minority stakes were excluded. This identified 987 deals (deals where at
least one legal advisor, on either the target or acquirer side, was reported). Experience is measured as the total
number of transactions between 2005--2010 for which the law firm is reported as the lead advisor (for either the
target or acquirer).
51The American Lawyer ranks law firms each year by gross revenue. For each year of Am Law 100 rankings over
2010--2013, we grouped the IPO law firms by whether they ranked in the top 25, next 26--50, bottom half, or
were not ranked. For the regressions, we assigned a firm to the group in which it appeared in three of the four
years. Most law firms (115) were not ranked, and these firms worked on most of the IPOs that did not have
forum clauses (85 percent). The remaining law firms were evenly divided across the ranked groups, and the
higher the ranked group, the higher the percentage of firms that had used such a clause at least once. The Legal
500 Series ranks law firms based on a series of performance metrics using client and peer rankings and analysis
of private information from the law firms to identify a set of elite firms by area of specialty, which are divided
into several tiers. For a description of the ranking methodology, see The Legal 500 Series, How Do You Rank
Firms/Sets? available at: http://www.legal500.com/assets/pages/about-us/how-it-works.html#rank. We searched
four specialties: capital markets, equity offerings (advice to issuers); large and mega M&A transactions; M&A liti-
gation; and securities shareholder litigation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Fraction Number
Panel A: Exclusive Forum Clauses (All)
Delaware forum 0.93 695
Stage of Adoption
Initial public offering 0.47 351
Midstream 0.53 395
Elective EFC
Initial public offering 0.83 254
Midstream 0.91 357
Year of Adoption
2006 < 0.01 1





2014 (Jan–Aug) 0.35 264
Observations 1.00 746
Panel B: Initial Public Offerings (2010–2014)
Exclusive forum clause (EFC) 0.45 305
Delaware corporation 0.76 517
California headquarters 0.25 171
Proceeds> $50m 0.68 460
Assets> $100m 0.58 395
Advising law firm has adopted EFC 1 time 0.57 386
Advising law firm has adopted EFC 2 years ago 0.26 174
Classified board 0.66 450
Advised by top 100 law firm 0.64 435
Observations 1.00 679
Panel C: Law Firms Advising IPOs (2010–2014)




 10 0.08 15




 4 0.13 23




 20 0.13 24
Am Law Top 100 0.37 67
Legal 500 0.27 50
EFC in 1st post-Revlon IPO (“innovative” law firm) 0.17 31
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100 firms by revenue. In addition, close to half the law firms had no experience with a
large M&A transaction pre-Revlon.
Panel D of Table 1 presents summary statistics for midstream adoptions. The vast
majority (over 80 percent) are adopted as bylaw amendments. Moreover, most of the
midstream charter adoptions (over 60 percent) were not subject to shareholder
approval. Only 12 percent of midstream adoptions were put to a shareholder vote, with
half of these occurring as stand-alone votes and half as bundled votes (primarily as a
vote on a reincorporation, in which the new domicile firm’s charter—which is not sub-
ject to a separate vote—has an exclusive forum provision).52 An additional 4 percent
were approved by written consent, most of which were bundled with a reincorporation.
As is true of IPO adopters, most midstream adopters are Delaware corporations
selecting Delaware courts as the exclusive forum (88 percent). However, five midstream
adopters selected a forum other than their statutory domicile, including two Delaware




Panel D: Exclusive Forum Clauses (Midstream Only)
Delaware forum 0.88 346
Post-Chevron 0.74 291
High litigation industry 0.31 121
Clean midstream bylaws 0.74 291
Charter 0.17 65
Separate shareholder votes 0.06 25
Bundled shareholder votes 0.06 23
Written consents 0.04 17
Merger (adopting corporation disappears) 0.05 20




NOTES: Each panel reports summary statistics according to different units of observation.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, SDC, SEC EDGAR.
52Three firms put a board-adopted bylaw up to a shareholder vote (two a year later, the other within six months);
we exclude the board adoptions from the midstream bylaw count and include these adoptions only in the sepa-
rate vote counts. Although the overwhelming number of firms seeking shareholder approval do so for charter
amendments, five of the separate votes were on clauses located in bylaws. Three firms with exclusive forum char-
ter provisions are included in Panel A as midstream adoptions but are excluded from Panel D and the analysis of
midstream adoptions in Section IV because they were identified as IPOs by SDC but the SEC filings indicated
that the firms had already been publicly traded, albeit to a limited extent, in over-the-counter markets.
53All of these adoptions were post-Chevron. One of the Delaware firms adopted the provision in conjunction with
a merger, and the provision was upheld against a challenge by shareholders seeking to sue in Delaware (see note
54). Delaware’s statutory proscription of such provisions in its 2015 legislation that validated the use of exclusive
forum clauses, D.G.C.L. § 115, seems quite unnecessary, given the small number of Delaware firms not designat-
ing the state as the exclusive forum (less than one-half of 1 percent). The Texas corporation had sought to
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chose their statutory domicile. The number of adopters that are non-Delaware corpora-
tions is higher for midstream than IPO adopters, and much higher than that reported
in the earlier Allen and Grundfest studies. The recent growth in the number of
adopters choosing non-Delaware forums suggests that there are other explanations
besides a preference for the expertise of the Delaware Chancery Court for why firms
adopt the provisions, such as the convenience of being sued locally as well as the
avoidance of duplicative litigation expense.
In contrast to IPO adopters, the bulk of midstream provisions (74 percent) were
adopted after Delaware validated bylaw adoption in Chevron (compare Figures 1 and 2).
Almost as many provisions were adopted in the first five months of 2014 as were adopted
in the six months following the decision in 2013. The post-Chevron surge is greater for mid-
stream bylaw than midstream charter adoptions (80 percent compared to 43 percent).
Elective clauses predominate nonwaivable ones in the midstream adoptions by an even
higher percentage than in the IPO adoptions, particularly in the post-Chevron timeframe
when nearly every clause (97 percent) provides for directorial discretion. Indeed, a chi-
Figure 1: Exclusive forum clauses at the IPO.
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NOTES: This figure graphs the probability that a corporate charter includes an exclusive forum clause at the IPO.
In Revlon, the Delaware Chancery Court suggested in dicta that corporations could adopt “charter provisions
selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”
reincorporate in Delaware three years earlier, with a charter including an exclusive forum provision, but the rein-
corporation proposal was withdrawn without being put to a shareholder vote.
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square test of the difference in exclusive forum clause format across midstream and IPO
adoptions is statistically significant in the post- but not the pre-Chevron period.
Lastly, event-driven bylaw adoptions are still relatively rare. Twenty midstream pro-
visions (5 percent) were adopted by a corporation at the time it entered into a merger
agreement in which it was being acquired. The small number might be explained by
uncertainty over their validity at the time our data were collected, as there were as yet
no decisions explicitly enforcing an exclusive forum bylaw adopted at the time of a spe-
cific transaction to litigation over the same transaction.54 Uncertainty over event-driven
bylaws’ enforceability encourages firms to act prophylactically and adopt a provision ex
ante, well before any transaction is on the horizon. Namely, ensuring the validity of an
exclusive forum provision should the firm enter into an acquisition in the future plausi-
bly explains the post-Chevron surge in bylaw adoptions because most are adopted by
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NOTES: For each month, this figure graphs the number of U.S. public corporations that adopted an exclusive
forum clause. In Chevron, the Delaware Chancery Court held that such clauses, even if unilaterally adopted by a
board via bylaw amendment, are facially valid under Delaware law.
54The decision of an Oregon court declining to follow a Delaware exclusive forum provision adopted in conjunc-
tion with a merger was overturned by the Oregon Supreme Court, Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor Inc., No.
54 (Ore. Sup. Ct., Dec. 10, 2015), following a Delaware Chancery Court opinion rendered in the interim, enforc-
ing a North Carolina exclusive forum clause. City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., CA No. 9795-
CB (Del. Ch., Sep. 8, 2014). All these decisions were rendered after our dataset collection concluded. With any
uncertainty over the validity of event-driven provisions seemingly resolved, there may be more event-driven adop-
tions in the future.
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firms not in high securities litigation risk industries, and they would therefore be most
concerned about multiforum litigation arising in an acquisition context.
IV. Results
Because of the possible wealth transfer from shareholders to managers from latecomer
terms, we separate the analysis of exclusive forum provisions by the time of adoption.
The first part of this section analyzes exclusive forum clauses that are adopted at the
IPO; the following part examines those adopted midstream.
A. Adoption at the IPO
The dynamics of exclusive forum clause adoption at the IPO and midstream stage differ
not only with respect to the opportunity for wealth transfers but also in the adoption
process. Virtually all Delaware firms now go public with exclusive forum provisions in
their charters, with IPO law firms playing a crucial role in their adoption.
1. The Transition Toward Universal Adoption
The dicta of Revlon sparked a revolution in IPO charters. This is evident on visual
inspection of Figure 1. The figure graphs the probability that a charter includes an
exclusive forum clause at the IPO. In December 2007, the NetSuite IPO was the first to
include an exclusive forum clause in its charter. Thereafter, prior to Revlon, no other
IPO included an exclusive forum clause.
Revlon was issued on March 15, 2010. Since the decision, exclusive forum clause
adoption has grown at a constant linear rate of over 15 percentage points per year. The
quadratic fit shown in Figure 1, though not statistically significant, suggests that if any-
thing the growth is slightly accelerating. In any case, by 2013, exclusive forum clauses
were being incorporated into over half of all Delaware firms’ charters at the IPO. As of
August 2014 (the end of the sample), the adoption rate is 80 percent.55 The rapid pat-
tern of adoptions indicates how innovative IPO chartering is, contrary to a contention
in the literature that IPO charters consist of rote boilerplate provisions and exhibit no
innovation.56
55A quadratic fit of the data in Figure 1 would predict universal adoption by the end of 2015. This comes from
an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator for adopting an exclusive forum clause and
the independent variables are years (since 2010) and years-squared. The sample for the regression is all U.S. cor-
porate IPOs since 2010.
56Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1325, 1329 (2013).
Although Klausner sees a failure to innovate and customize to maximize share value in IPO charters’ seemingly
boilerplate inclusion of provisions, the data on exclusive forum clauses suggest that a contrary conclusion could
well be drawn from such a pattern: innovations rapidly diffuse, achieving near universal adoption when lawyers
(and, derivatively, their clients) perceive the provisions to have universal value. In addition, there is variation in
the formulation of the clauses concerning matters such as the number of permissible forums and the specifica-
tion of investors’ deemed consent (Allen 2014, supra note 26, at 5) and whether operation of the clause may be
waived by the board, again contrary to the contention that IPO charter choices are rote boilerplate, although
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The effect of Revlon on adoption at the IPO has been remarkably constant since
the day that Revlon was issued. In contrast, neither the 2013 Chevron case (on the validity
of bylaw adoption) nor any other event seems to have affected this trend. (By contrast,
midstream adoptions were dramatically effected by Chevron, as indicated in Figure 2.)
The inapplicability of Chevron to the decision for IPO adoption (which is almost always
through a charter provision) confirms our distinction—indeed, the literature’s distinc-
tion—between IPO and midstream adoption. This distinction is further validated by the
fact that whereas IPO adoption is now almost universal, midstream adopters are still a
small minority (only a few hundred out of thousands of public companies).
Figure 1 also motivates a reappraisal of the empirical approach to studying exclu-
sive forum clause adoption. The previous literature has focused on explaining the adop-
tion decision for any given firm. The core idea is that firms that are particularly at risk
of multiforum litigation should be more likely to adopt an exclusive forum clause. Such
“litigation risk factors” could work both in favor and against the case for exclusive forum
clauses: in favor if multiforum litigation is driven by lawyer opportunism or a perceived
tendency of some foreign courts to assume jurisdiction even without an obvious efficien-
cy or fairness rationale (e.g., the “California effect” discussed in the Allen and Grundfest
studies); or against if, as some critics would argue, the exclusive forum clause is just
another mechanism to entrench management. The existing literature essentially com-
bines these two possibilities into a single “litigation risk” measure.
An approach that focuses on individual firms’ decisions may continue to be sensible
when considering midstream adoption, since this is the case in which a board acts unilateral-
ly and perhaps in anticipation of a litigation-prone event such as a merger. But for IPO adop-
tion, Figure 1 demonstrates that the game may soon be over; universal adoption is nigh.
Figure 1 thus motivates an approach that explains not just an individual firm’s deci-
sion, but the entire transition itself, the shift from 0 to (nearly) 100 percent adoption for
IPOs. There are two possible explanations for this transition: (1) exclusive forum clauses
are adopted seemingly at random; they are in most firms’ interest but whether or when a
firm adopts one is not determined by any important characteristic of the firm itself, or
(2) there is some kind of selection effect that drives a diffusion process; some types of
firms are particularly likely to adopt it while others simply follow the trend.
2. Law Firms as the Drivers of the Transition: A Light-Switch Hypothesis
The question is: What is the vehicle of diffusion? The fact that the trend in Figure 1 is
linear actually eliminates a large class of possibilities. Specifically, we can reject a stan-
dard diffusion model that is based on individual firms. A standard diffusion model
would posit that the likelihood of adoption is an increasing function of the current state
some of the nonuniformity may be due to experimentation given the clauses’ early stage of development rather
than tailoring to firms’ specific circumstances. For instance, in the later years of our dataset, virtually all the pro-
visions permit the board to waive the clause. Further, staggered boards, a takeover defense that Klausner consid-
ers to be problematic charter boilerplate, are not universal in IPO charters, indicating that customization does
indeed occur, as discussed in Section IV.A.3. It is alternatively possible, however, that the pattern of charter inno-
vation that we identify is unique to exclusive forum clauses, given their legal subject matter.
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of prevalence: the individual likelihood of adoption is some fixed probability (whether high
or low) multiplied by the current rate of adoption. In this case, adoption rates are accelerat-
ing (this is the first part of the so-called S-curve found in studies of the diffusion of innova-
tions). The higher the current state of adoption, the larger the change in adoption rate for
the next period. The observed trend, however, is not accelerating. The quadratic fit is
graphed in Figure 1 and the coefficient on the quadratic term is neither substantial nor sta-
tistically significant (0.005 with standard error 0.01). The best fit is thus linear. The first-
pass analysis suggests that the rate of diffusion through IPOs is constant; a given company’s
decision to adopt does not depend multiplicatively on the current level of adoption.
If the vehicle of diffusion is neither randomness nor the companies themselves,
another potential source could be legal counsel. Suggestive of such an hypothesis, two
studies have provided evidence that law firms influence IPO charters.57 Robert Daines
finds that IPO firms are more likely to be incorporated in Delaware than in their home
state when advised by a national law firm as opposed to by local legal counsel.58 John
Coates finds that firms going public in 1991–1992 that were advised by New York law
firms are more likely to have anti-takeover defenses in their charters than IPOs coun-
seled by Silicon Valley law firms, with the law firms’ M&A experience strongly correlated
with the presence of defenses. He further finds that by 1998–1999, the difference had
disappeared. He attributes the transition to law firm learning, as Silicon Valley corpora-
tions experienced hostile bids for the first time in the mid-1990s.59 The disparate con-
tent across charters is interpreted as a function of law firm expertise and potential
agency problems of lawyers’ interests not being well aligned with those of issuers. We
adapt these insights on lawyers’ key role in the crafting of IPO charters to explain what
is a quite different pattern of exclusive forum provision adoptions, compared to the
domicile and takeover defense decisions explored in those studies.
Specifically, a linear trend of exclusive forum provision adoptions could be
explained by a model in which law firms are the vehicle of diffusion for this new legal
technology. Imagine the stylized case in which there are N law firms and each law firm
advises a fixed number of IPOs per year. Suppose further that, each year, one of these
law firms (or any other constant number) suddenly decides that, from then on, all of
the IPOs it advises will include an exclusive forum clause. Call this the “light-switch”
model of diffusion; the idea being that when a law firm suddenly switches from zero
adoption to total adoption, the time series of adoption for that law firm resembles a
light switch, for example, “0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1.”
Figure 3 tests the light-switch model in a simple event analysis framework. The event
is the first time that the law firm advises an IPO adopter. Subsequent IPOs are all
“postevent” for the law firm. If the light-switch model were perfectly correct, all postevent
57John Coates, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301 (2001); Rob-
ert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 6 (2002).
58Daines, supra note 57, at 1595.
59Coates, supra note 57, at 1304, 1362--65, 1370--73, 1377, 1380.
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IPOs would include an exclusive forum clause and the adoption rate would immediately
jump from 0 to 1. The postevent sample includes 315 IPOs advised by 43 law firms.
The light-switch model shows promise. Figure 3 separates two groups of law firms:
(1) Wilson Sonsini and (2) everyone else (as explained later). First consider law firms
other than Wilson Sonsini. The instantaneous light-switch effect is about 60 percent for
these law firms. That is, when these law firms adopt for the first time, the likelihood of
adoption for their next IPO jumps to 60 percent. Within two years, their adoption rate
climbs to 85 percent. Within 3.5 years, their adoption rate is—remarkably—100 percent.
Seven law firms (excluding Wilson Sonsini) have over 3.5 years’ experience, and all of
their last 24 IPOs have included an exclusive forum clause.
Wilson Sonsini is a special case: Wilson Sonsini advised the first IPO to adopt an
exclusive forum clause, NetSuite in 2007, well before Revlon. NetSuite’s adoption seems
to have been a kind of legal experiment.60 After NetSuite, no other IPO adopted an
exclusive forum clause until after Revlon (in 2010). Wilson Sonsini itself did not adopt
one again until 2011. In the interim, Wilson Sonsini had advised another 12 IPOs. Wil-
son Sonsini’s “event time” is thus somewhat out of sync with other law firms. Yet even if
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NOTES: This figure graphs the likelihood that a law firm adopts an exclusive forum clause in the corporate charter
at the IPO, before and after adopting it for the first time. The “light-switch” hypothesis posits that law firms make
a once-and-for-all decision to adopt exclusive forum clauses, inducing a discontinuous jump in adoption rates
before and after first-time adoption. In the extreme case, the adoption rate would jump from 0 to 100 percent.
60See Grundfest, supra note 5.
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one syncs it back by dropping the NetSuite IPO, Wilson Sonsini remains an outlier
(though the difference is less stark). While all of its peer law firms have quickly transi-
tioned to 100 percent adoption, Wilson Sonsini’s adoption rate has grown, but at a
much slower pace. It is currently at approximately 50 percent.
Table 2 tests the light-switch model in a regression framework. The unit of obser-
vation is the IPO. Each column lists the results of an OLS regression in which the
dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the corporation has an exclusive forum
clause at its IPO.61 The first specification includes only a constant (Column 1). It esti-
mates that 45 percent of all IPOs since 2010 have included an exclusive forum clause.
Table 2: Exclusive Forum Clause at IPO
Dependent Variable is an Indicator for Exclusive Forum Clause
All IPOs, 2010–2014 Non-W.S. Del. Non-Del.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Law firm has adopted 1 time 0.79* 0.71* 0.73* 0.76* 0.76* 0.31
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18)
Law firm has adopted 2 years ago 20.08 0.09* 20.11* 0.19
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.31)
Delaware corporation 0.38* 0.05 0.05 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
California headquarters 0.01 20.07* 20.06* 20.01 20.04 20.08
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Proceeds> $50m 0.23* 0.06* 0.07* 0.08* 0.08* 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Assets> $100m 0.01 20.00 20.00 20.01 20.01 20.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.45*
(0.02)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.45 0.79 0.40 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.82 0.37
Observations 679 679 678 678 678 638 517 161
NOTES: Each column lists the coefficients from an OLS regression. The main sample is all IPOs since 2010 for
corporations domiciled in the United States and subject to federal securities law. “Non-W.S.” restricts the sample
to IPOs for which Wilson Sonsini was not the advising law firm. “Del.” restricts the sample to IPOs of Delaware
corporations. “Law firm has adopted 1 time” is an indicator equal to 1 if the law firm advising the IPO has pre-
viously adopted an exclusive forum clause or if this is the first time. “Law firm has adopted 2 years ago” is an
indicator equal to 1 if the law firm has previously adopted an exclusive forum clause in an IPO more than two
years ago. The unit of observation is the IPO. Standard errors clustered by law firm are in parentheses. *Indicates
statistically significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, SDC, SEC EDGAR.
61A probit or logit specification is typically used to estimate a probability model. However, the probit and logit
maximum likelihood estimates of the light-switch coefficient do not exist because the light-switch variable perfect-
ly predicts failure, a problem that is known in the literature as the “quasi-complete separation” problem in limit-
ed dependent variable models. A. Albert & J.A. Anderson, On the Existence of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
in Logistic Regression Models, 71 Biometrika 1 (1984). Namely, the light-switch variable equal to 0 always implies
that there is no exclusive forum clause, which would imply a probit or logit coefficient of infinity. We therefore
use the linear probability model (OLS), which can be estimated. Although the predicted values can fall outside
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The second specification tests the light-switch hypothesis (Column 2 of Table 2). It
omits the constant term and includes only one control: a variable that we refer to as the
“light-switch” indicator. The light-switch indicator is equal to 1 if the IPO is advised by a
law firm that (1) has previously adopted an exclusive forum clause or (2) is now adopting
one for the first time. We call this the “light-switch” variable because, for every law firm, it
starts at 0 and then permanently switches to 1 the first time the law firm adopts an exclu-
sive forum clause. The mean of this variable is 0.57, as indicated in Panel B of Table 1, so
“post-light-switch” law firms advised 57 percent of all IPOs since 2010.
If the light-switch indicator’s coefficient were exactly 1, then the light-switch mod-
el perfectly explains the data and law firms make a once-and-for-all decision to adopt
exclusive forum clauses for all their IPOs. If adoption bears no relation to the advising
law firm, the light-switch indicator’s coefficient will be approximately 0.45 (the uncondi-
tional adoption rate from specification 1).62 The estimated coefficient with the full sam-
ple is 0.79 (standard error 0.02). Thus, the model estimates that the average light-switch
effect is nearly 80 percent complete.
The next specification separately considers a few of the determinants of adoption that
are discussed in the literature (Column 3 of Table 2).63 These include indicators for whether
the company is incorporated in Delaware, whether the company headquarters is in Califor-
nia, small versus large firms, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. Not surprisingly,
firms incorporated in Delaware as well as large IPOs (over $50 million in proceeds) are
more likely to include an exclusive forum clause (38 and 23 percentage points, respectively).
However, these effects significantly diminish in the full specification that combines
the literature’s determinants with the light-switch model (Column 4 of Table 2). Both
the large IPO and Delaware corporation coefficients plummet. The coefficient for large
IPOs drops to 6 percentage points and remains (marginally) significant. The Delaware
effect drops to 5 percentage points and is no longer significant.
Further, the California effect becomes negative 7 percent and significant. This is
surprising given the discussions of previous studies, which suggest that, in an effort to
avoid California courts, firms headquartered in California would be more likely to adopt
an exclusive forum clause.64 In subsequent specifications (described below) the Califor-
nia effect remains negative but not always statistically significant. Even if the true Califor-
nia effect were positive, it is unlikely to be large.65
the 0 to 1 probability range, OLS provides a consistent estimator of the marginal effect of the light-switch coeffi-
cient, which is the measure of interest for our analysis.
62They would be exactly equal (in expectation) if we excluded IPOs in which the law firm adopts for the first
time. We do this as a robustness check and find that the main results do not change.
63See the literature review in Section II.B.
64See Allen 2011, supra note 30, at ii; Grundfest, supra note 5, at 368; and Section II.B, at note 33, discussing the
studies’ analyses of a California effect.
65The negative California effect also seems to be entirely driven by Wilson Sonsini. It disappears when one moves
from the specification that includes Wilson Sonsini to the one that excludes it (i.e., from Column 5 to 6).
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The next specification (Column 5 of Table 2) includes an additional indicator
that the law firm has previously adopted an exclusive forum clause more than two years
ago. This is the case for 26 percent of IPOs (see Panel B of Table 1). This coefficient
would be positive if the light-switch model were true, but not instantaneous; the full
transition instead occurring over a few years. Figure 3 has already shown this to be the
case for seven of the eight law firms that have over 3.5 years of experience, for whom all
of the last 24 IPOs have included an exclusive forum clause. In the full sample (Column
5), this coefficient is not statistically significant and it does not explain any additional
variance (the R-squared remains 0.80 with and without it). As one might expect, if we
exclude Wilson Sonsini, both the light-switch and the transition coefficients increase
and are significant (Column 6). The average effect is 76 percentage points; the addition-
al effect after two years is 9 percentage points. Thus, with the full set of controls (and
excluding Wilson Sonsini), law firms with over two years of experience adopt exclusive
forum provisions 85 percent of the time.
The final two specifications compare IPOs for Delaware versus non-Delaware
corporations (Columns 7 and 8 of Table 2). The differences are stark. For Delaware
corporations, the light-switch coefficient is 76 percent and highly significant.66 For non-
Delaware IPOs, the light-switch coefficient plummets to 31 percent and is not
significant. This is not surprising since only four out of 167 IPOs by non-Delaware cor-
porations have included an exclusive forum clause. Thus, both the light-switch model
and the exclusive forum clause are Delaware-specific phenomena.
To summarize, the Revlon dicta ushered in a transition period for the charters of
new public companies. In five years, IPO adoption of exclusive forum provisions are
nearing universality, going from essentially zero pre-Revlon to about 80 percent by
August 2014. Our analysis further suggests that the transition is driven primarily by the
corporate bar. Law firms that advise IPOs seem to follow approximately a “light-switch”
model in which the law firm makes a once-and-for-all decision to adopt an exclusive
forum clause in its IPOs.
3. Robustness of the Finding that Law Firms Drive the Transition
At first glance, the results suggest that law firms are the primary drivers of the transition
toward universal adoption of exclusive forum clauses. Indeed, the light-switch indicator
by itself explains twice as much variance as all of the other controls combined. Compar-
ing the adjusted R-squared from Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2, the light-switch model by
itself explains about 80 percent of the variance versus about 40 percent for all other
66The transition coefficient (having more than two years’ experience) is negative and statistically significant, but
this is again completely due to Wilson Sonsini. When Wilson Sonsini is omitted, this coefficient becomes positive
(0.08 with standard error 0.04) and the light-switch coefficient also increases (0.75 with standard error 0.03).
Note that these results are not shown in Table 2.
56 Romano and Sanga
controls. We can reject the hypothesis that the two models explain the data equally well.
(The p value is below 0.001.67)
However, there is a crucial caveat to this analysis: The company going public chooses
its law firm. It is therefore possible that companies that want exclusive forum clauses are
simply choosing law firms that have adopted them in the past. A more nuanced version of
this concern would posit that a company does not necessarily choose a law firm based on
its tendency to adopt exclusive forum clauses per se, but based on its tendency to insert
charter provisions that, at least according to some critics, work in management’s favor.
To address this selection concern, we conduct a placebo test to see if the presence
of another popular charter provision—a staggered board—follows a similar trend of dif-
fusion. To do this, we replicate the analysis for exclusive charter provisions in Figures 1
and 3 and Table 2 for staggered boards. As indicated in Panel B of Table 1, at the time
of their IPO, more firms have staggered boards than exclusive forum provisions (66 per-
cent compared to 45 percent, respectively).68
In contrast to exclusive forum provisions, the adoption of a staggered board does
not seem to follow any kind of diffusion process or light-switch model. Figure 4 shows
that the likelihood that a corporation has a staggered board (in either the charter or
bylaws) at the time of the IPO was roughly constant over the same period (at 66 per-
cent). This contrast is clear when one compares Figure 4 with Figure 1 (the adoption of
exclusive forum clauses at the IPO). Further, the light-switch coefficient for staggered
board clauses is either small (less than one-fourth the magnitude for exclusive forum
clauses) or insignificant. Law firms do not explain nearly as much variance in staggered
board clauses as they do for exclusive forum clauses.69
We present this placebo test in order to contrast two models of the dynamics of cor-
porate governance. Exclusive forum clauses are seemingly adopted at the law-firm level
and then applied in every circumstance as a kind of “best practice” or boilerplate, as best
practices become boilerplate over time. Staggered boards, by contrast, appear to be
adopted at the company level; that is, law firms would seem to be advising their clients to
adopt them on a case-by-case basis. This is perhaps to be expected since the former are
arguably in the interest of all parties, while the latter are generally considered as geared
67We cannot perform a standard F test to compare goodness of fit because the two specifications are nonnested.
That is, neither model’s set of independent variables is a subset of the other. Instead, we perform the likelihood
ratio test suggested by Vuong. See Quang H. Vuong, Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested
Hypotheses, 57 Econometrica 307 (1989).
68The presence of a staggered board at the time of the IPO is manually collected from firms’ SEC filings in
EDGAR.
69The results are on file with the authors. In contrast to exclusive forum provisions, corporations have had staggered
boards for centuries, and it is possible that when staggered board clauses were new, a light-switch model would have
fit the data better. However, other data suggest that might not be the case. Studies of the prevalence of staggered
boards in IPOs occurring after the increase in hostile takeovers of the 1980s indicate that the proportion has varied
considerably, from 34--35 percent of IPOs in 1988--1992 and 44 percent in 1994--1997, to 66 percent in 1998 and 82
percent in 1999. Coates, supra note 57, at 1377. Such variability is not consistent with a light-switch model.
57The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation
toward entrenching management.70 To put the point another way, the light-switch adop-
tion of exclusive forum provisions but not of staggered boards is consistent with a charac-
terization of forum clauses (or law firms’ perceptions of them) as universally enhancing
shareholder wealth but takeover defenses as wealth enhancing for only a subset of firms.71
A second concern regarding the interpretation of law firms as drivers of exclusive
forum provision adoptions is that the analysis may have omitted a key alternative source
of innovation, the IPO firm’s investment banker. This would be especially a problem if
the selection of a law firm were highly correlated with the selection of an underwriter.
That is, a large law firm could tend to work with the same underwriter or small group
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NOTES: This figure graphs the probability that the corporate charter or bylaws include a staggered board clause at
the IPO.
70Most of the literature views takeover defenses, such as staggered boards, as management entrenchment devices.
E.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in
IPOs, 17 J. L. Econ. & Org. 83, 83 (2001).
71For example, William Johnson and colleagues advance a “bonding hypothesis” of takeover defenses in IPO
charters for which they provide empirical support: for firms with important long-term business relations with a
large customer or supplier, defenses serve as commitment devices that their business strategies will not be altered
and diminish (or expropriate) the value of those business partners’ investments in the relationship (quasi-rents).
William C. Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. Fin.
Econ. 307 (2015). In addition, defenses might reduce managerial myopia for the set of firms that need to invest
in long-term projects. See Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 61 (1988).
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of underwriters on all its deals. The concern, then, is that it is in fact the underwriters—
not the law firms—that advise new corporations to include an exclusive forum provision
in their charter.
To address this concern, we collected data on the underwriter for each of the
IPOs in our sample. We then reran the regressions in Table 2 (the light-switch model)
both for underwriters by themselves and jointly for underwriters and law firms.72 When
tested by themselves, underwriters have a large and significant light-switch coefficient.
Depending on the specification, it hovers around 0.65. However, when controls are
added, the underwriter light-switch coefficient drops significantly. When tested together
with law firms, it drops further to at most 0.1 and sometimes closer to zero. By contrast,
the law firm’s light-switch coefficient remains high across all specifications. This result is
robust across the specifications in Table 2. We therefore conclude that it is not likely
that underwriters drive the transition rather than law firms.
Finally, we investigate a third potential transmission channel that might be as or
more consequential than law firms, overlapping (also referred to as interlocking) directors
on IPO firms’ boards. A director on the board of a company with an exclusive forum pro-
vision can serve as an information conduit concerning the provisions for another firm on
whose board the director also serves. In the context of adopting a novel legal device, such
as an exclusive forum provision, a director’s ability to opine from experience could
increase the comfort level of other board members to innovate. There is, indeed, support
for the presence of such an effect, as studies have found that companies are more likely
to adopt governance-related innovations when they share a director with a firm that has
already adopted the innovation.73 It is also possible that rather than serving as informa-
tion conduits, overlapping board members could generate a selection effect, obscuring
the relation between law firms and exclusive forum clause adoptions.74 That could be so,
72The unreported regression results are available from the authors. SDC reported a financial advisor (i.e., under-
writer) for 83 percent of the sample IPOs. Most IPOs have multiple financial advisors. We ran two sets of regres-
sions, one using as the underwriter variable only the first entity listed for an IPO (which would be the first
investment bank listed in the offering’s tombstone), and another counting all the IPOs for which a bank was
listed. There are 51 (80) underwriters that are first-listed (listed in any position) in the sample, 10 (27) of which
underwrote only one IPO and 20 (30) of which never underwrote an IPO with an exclusive forum provision. We
can reject the hypothesis that legal and financial advisors are independently distributed with p value  0.0001.
73E.g., Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Outside Directors’ Protection, J. Leg. Stud. (forth-
coming) (tracking spread of indemnification provisions in the wake of a change in the law, firms with directors
on the board of a company that had adopted enhanced indemnification provisions are three times more likely to
adopt the provisions than firms without such directors); Gerald Davis, Agents Without Principles? The Spread of
the Poison Pill Through the Intercorporate Network, 36 Adm. Sci. Q. 583 (1991) (tracking diffusion of poison
pill takeover defense upon its judicial validation, firms with more director interlocks to prior adopters are more
likely to adopt a pill, although by the end of the sample period, as 60 percent of firms had pills, a set of firms
with many interlocks remained without them).
74It is also possible that directors are selected because of the governance features of the firms on whose boards
they already serve. See Christa H.S. Bouwman, Corporate Governance Propagation Through Overlapping Direc-
tors, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2358 (2011) (examining the presence of five governance practices and board overlaps
finds support for both interlocking director influence on governance adoption and selection of directors for
being on companies with the same governance practices). But given the numerous dimensions of firms’
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if, for instance, individual directors prefer to work with specific law firms and, more par-
ticularly, if directors in “demand” to serve on IPO boards prefer law firms that use exclu-
sive forum provisions.
To address this concern, we performed a test that is similar to the previous robust-
ness check for underwriters. We collected data on the directors of each of the IPOs in
our sample, as well as for midstream adopters from the board and directors databases
constructed by Boardex.75 We then used these data to construct an analogous “director
light-switch” indicator, which is equal to 1 if any director on the IPO firm is on the
board of a company that has previously adopted an exclusive forum provision (either
another IPO or midstream). The results are even starker than for the underwriter set-
ting. When tested by themselves, overlapping directors have a large and significant light-
switch coefficient. However, when tested together with law firms, the director light-
switch coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. With full controls, the coefficient
is 0.02 (with standard error 0.03). This qualitative result holds for including the director
light-switch variable in all specifications in Table 2. It also holds when we use the num-
ber or percentage of board members that have been on boards of prior adopters
(instead of the light-switch indicator for whether any board member has been on the
board of a prior adopter). Together with the underwriter results, this strengthens the
conclusion that the transition is indeed driven by law firms.
4. Explaining the Timing of the Transition
The analysis above suggests that law firms are the primary drivers of the transition
toward universal adoption of exclusive forum clauses. This finding in turn motivates a
further question: What drives the timing of this transition? That is, what determines
when a law firm makes its once-and-for-all decision to adopt exclusive forum clauses for
all IPOs?
This section discusses the potential roles of three actors behind the timing of this
transition: courts, lawyers, and companies. Of these three, we conclude that courts and
lawyers are, in all likelihood, the most influential. However, we also conclude that it is
difficult to predict when any given law firm will “flip the switch,” that is, when it will
transition from never adopting to always adopting.
governance, we think it improbable that the selection criterion would be the presence of an exclusive forum pro-
vision, were an IPO firm to be choosing directors according to the governance practices of firms on whose boards
they were already serving.
75The Boardex dataset contains information on the affiliations of directors on the boards of over 17,000 compa-
nies since 1999; as the dataset tracks both individual directors as well as companies, even if company X is not in
the dataset, if a director on company Y that is in the dataset also serves on the board of X, that interlock will be
identified (in the individual’s entry). Counting by firm entries, 605 of 680 IPO firms (89 percent) are in the
Boardex dataset, and all the missing firms are nonadopters, so there is no loss in identifying an interlocking
director.
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a. Courts. Perhaps the most straightforward hypothesis is that the timing of a law firm’s
adoption is entirely driven by the Revlon decision.76 The simplest version of this hypoth-
esis is that all law firms “flipped the switch” right after Revlon. From the previous section
(and Figure 1 specifically) we already know that this is not the case; the transition took
several years.
However, consider a slightly refined version of this hypothesis. Suppose we sepa-
rate law firms into two groups: (1) law firms that have never adopted an exclusive forum
clause and (2) law firms that have adopted at least once. Suppose further that we find
that all law firms of the latter group adopted an exclusive forum clause in their first
post-Revlon IPO. This would be strong evidence that the timing of adoption is driven by
the Revlon decision.
Figure 5 shows that, roughly speaking, Revlon could account for up to 44 percent
of the timing decision. Figure 5 graphs how long it took for law firms to adopt an exclu-
sive forum clause for the first time after Revlon. The sample is restricted to “Group 2”
law firms, law firms that eventually adopted a provision at least once (71 of 183). The x-
axis indicates the law firm’s n-th post-Revlon IPO; the y-axis is the fraction of Group 2
law firms that have ever adopted a provision after Revlon.77 By definition, the fraction
that have ever adopted a provision post-Revlon is equal to 0 at time zero (the first circle
in Figure 5) and equal to 1 when the last “surviving” law firm finally adopts a provision
for the first time (the last circle).
The second circle of Figure 5 shows that 44 percent of law firms (31 of 71)
adopted an exclusive forum clause in their very first post-Revlon IPO. The next circle
shows that 68 percent of law firms had adopted by their second post-Revlon IPO (48 of
71).78 This figure eventually climbs to 100 percent by the 10th IPO. Thus, many law
firms that eventually “flipped the switch” waited for several IPOs after Revlon. Since 44
percent of law firms that have ever adopted did so in their first post-Revlon IPO, a gener-
ous (and admittedly loose) interpretation of these data is that Revlon accounts for 44
percent of the timing of the transition.
b. Lawyers. There are several possible reasons why law firms that eventually adopted
exclusive forum clauses did not do so immediately after Revlon. One possibility is that
76Where a novel provision, such as an exclusive forum clause, might appear to benefit managers at shareholders’
expense, investment bankers would tend to caution against including it, out of concern for an IPO’s pricing
were a provision to limit shareholders’ rights. In such a context, the Chancery Court’s validation of the provision
can provide credibility that it will benefit shareholders, reducing the cost of innovation, as lawyers can tell the
bankers that the provision has been accepted and will work.
77Technically speaking, Figure 5 is 1 minus the survival rate of law firms, where the event is the first time a law
firm adopts an exclusive forum clause since Revlon.
78That is, 485 31 law firms that adopted in the first IPO1 17 that did not adopt in the first but adopted in the
second IPO.
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the transition mechanism works through a diffusion process. For example, law firms
could drive the process through word of mouth, which takes time. Similarly, it could be
that a law firm will adopt a new legal technology only after observing that certain other
law firms have successfully adopted it. Some law firms may be slower to learn about the
latest legal technology, or they may be particularly difficult to convince, if, for instance,
they have strong contrary priors concerning the efficacy of the technology. Put another
way, some law firms may be more willing to try new legal strategies while others may sim-
ply follow the trend. All these hypotheses are ultimately based on law firms’ willingness
or ability to innovate.
One interpretation of Figure 5 is that it graphs the “willingness to innovate”
thresholds for law firms. According to Figure 5, 44 percent of law firms adopted an
exclusive forum clause in their first post-Revlon IPO. These 44 percent might be labeled
“legal innovators” since they were willing to innovate immediately after the Delaware
court’s endorsement. The law firms whose first-time adoption was their second post-
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NOTES: This figure graphs the fraction of law firms that have adopted an exclusive forum clause at least once
since the Revlon decision. The sample is all law firms that have ever adopted an exclusive forum clause (71 law
firms in total). The dashed line is the cubic spline fit.
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Revlon IPO (about 24 percent)79 might in turn be called “early adopters,” since they are
willing to adopt but only after observing that others have successfully innovated. By this
interpretation, law firms that wait for their third, fourth, or later post-Revlon IPO are suc-
cessively less willing to innovate.80
We can also learn about the transition timing by comparing Figure 5 with Figure
1. Both graph essentially the same concept—the rate of diffusion of exclusive forum
clauses—but from different perspectives. Figure 1 graphs the process where the unit of
observation is the IPO, while Figure 5 graphs the process where the unit of observation
is the law firm. Neither fit the standard “S-curve” innovation diffusion process, in which
diffusion is first accelerating and then decelerating. The IPO process (Figure 1) is line-
ar, so diffusion occurs at a constant rate. In contrast, the law firm process (Figure 5),
which we have described as a “light-switch approach,” is first discontinuous and then
decelerating; the light-switch effect essentially skips the first part of the S-curve and
jumps straight to the second part. The fact that we do not observe an analogous light-
switch effect for IPOs (i.e., there is no discontinuous jump after Revlon in Figure 1) is
further evidence that the light-switch model applies only to law firms and not to corpo-
rations generally.
Finally, we investigate whether law firms’ characteristics predict the timing of the
transition. One might think that a law firm’s size, quality, or past experience with IPOs
or M&A activity (where recent years’ high litigation rates could suggest the value of an
exclusive forum clause) might predict whether it flips the switch early or late in the tran-
sition. To address this, we defined two measures of a law firm’s willingness to innovate,
whether its first post-Revlon IPO had an exclusive forum provision and its total number
of post-Revlon IPOs till first adoption. We then ran regressions for each of these on the
law firms’ Am Law 100 and Legal 500 rankings,81 along with their pre-Revlon IPO and
M&A experience.82 We also experimented with specifications that use the IPO (rather
79This is equal to 68 minus 44 percent; that is, the percent that had adopted at least once by the second IPO
minus the percent that adopted at the first IPO.
80Two caveats are in order. First, we do not argue that Figure 5 proves this interpretation. We only offer this as
one way of interpreting it. Second, Figure 5 only includes the 71 (out of 183) law firms that have ever adopted
an exclusive forum clause. Thus, the numbers above only apply to the subpopulation of law firms that are eventu-
ally willing to innovate (at least within five years of Revlon). Roughly speaking, one would multiply these figures
by 0.39 (71/183) to recover the percentages for the full sample of law firms that have advised post-Revlon IPOs.
So, for example, only 0.39 * 445 17 percent of the full sample are “legal innovators.”
81The reported regression uses an indicator variable for whether the law firm was ranked in the Am Law 100. As
a robustness check, we also regressed indicators for various gradations in the Am Law rank (e.g., whether the law
firm ranked in the top 10, the top 25, ranks 25--50), and the results were substantially unchanged. Because of the
small number of firms ranked in any of the specified Legal 500 Series practice specialties (see note 51), the Legal
500 variable is an indicator that equals 1 for any law firm ever ranked in any of the tiers in any of those specialty
areas over 2009--2014.
82The IPO dataset is as previously described, tallying the law firm’s experience from January 1, 2005 until the
Revlon decision on March 10, 2010, and the M&A dataset is as described in note 50. As a robustness check, we
ran the regressions with three alternative methods of defining M&A experience: (1) only transactions for which
firms advised targets, (2) only transactions for which they advised acquirers, and (3) all transactions for which
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than the law firm) as the unit of observation. Table 3 presents the results of regressions
for law firms’ innovation propensity measured as whether they adopted a provision in the
first IPO after Revlon. As it indicates, the results are mixed, small, and only occasionally
significant.83 We found no robust association between any law firm characteristic and its
Table 3: Law Firms’ Willingness to Innovate
Dependent Variable Indicator for Adopted on First Post-Revlon IPO
Unit of Observation Law Firm
Sample Law Firm’s First Post-Revlon IPO




20.05 20.05 20.01 20.05 20.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Experience #Pre2Revlon M&As10
 
0.03 0.04* 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Legal 500 (ever ranked) 0.12 0.19* 20.01 20.03 20.07
(0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Am Law (top 100) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Delaware corporation 0.36* 0.32*
(0.08) (0.09)
California headquarters 0.07 0.07
(0.11) (0.11)
Proceeds> $50m 0.28* 0.18*
(0.09) (0.08)
Assets> $100m 20.10 20.00
(0.08) (0.08)
Constant
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 20.00 0.03 0.06 0.06 20.01 0.18 0.11 0.21
Observations 183 183 183 130 183 183 183 130 129 130 129
NOTES: Each column lists the coefficients from an OLS regression. *Indicates statistically significantly different
from zero at 95 percent confidence.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, SDC, SEC EDGAR.
firms are listed as an advisor, whether or not it was “lead-advisor” status. (Our reported regressions did not count
non-lead-advisor roles as experience because of the possibility that subsequently listed legal advisors may be coun-
sel for specialized issues, such as antitrust or regulatory concerns, or local counsel in cross-border transactions,
and hence might not have been involved in any shareholder litigation.) There were no significant differences
across the various formulations.
83The results are the same using the other proxies for innovation propensity. The Am Law, Legal 500, and M&A
experience variables are occasionally significantly positive, but when controls for the IPO characteristic are
included (e.g., size, Delaware domicile), they typically lose their significance. IPO experience, with a coefficient
close to zero, is never significant. Because of the high variance in M&A experience, we also ran the regressions
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willingness to innovate.84 The conclusion that we draw from this exercise is that the
observable characteristics of law firms do not robustly predict the timing of the transition.
c. Companies. An alternative hypothesis is that the first adoption decision is somehow
driven by the characteristics of the current IPO firm or by the law firm’s history of IPO
firms. There are both practical and logical reasons for why this is not a compelling
hypothesis. First, the sample of first-time adoption is only a 10th of the total sample of
IPOs (71 of 679). Even if we did find that the IPOs in which law firms adopt for the first
time were, for example, of disproportionally large companies, the sample size is proba-
bly too small to conclude much from this. Second, we already found in the previous sec-
tion that the explanatory power of all other controls related to the IPO was significantly
less than the light-switch model by itself.
Finally, in results not reported, we also test for correlation between corporate gov-
ernance features and an exclusive forum provision by including an indicator for a stag-
gered board in all the specifications of Table 2. The coefficients are small and
statistically insignificant.
B. Midstream Adoptions
Outside counsel no doubt can influence midstream adoptions by suggesting to public
companies’ general counsel that they should adopt the provisions.85 However, it is not
possible to test a light-switch hypothesis for midstream adoptions. Data on public corpo-
rations’ use of outside counsel are not publicly available.86 Further, the adoption of a
using a log transformation and other formulations, such as an indicator variable for experience above the medi-
an level; there was no significant difference across the formulations. The results of these unreported regressions
are on file with the authors.
84We also included in the regressions measures of the distance of the law firm from Delaware (an indicator vari-
able for proximity defined as whether the law firm was located less than one-half the distance from Wilmington
to Los Angeles, or less than 1-10th the distance, which respectively includes firms as far west as Chicago, or essen-
tially only New York firms), on the view that the further the law firm from Delaware, the lower the propensity to
include an exclusive forum clause, as its cost of litigating in Delaware would be higher than a firm located closer
to Delaware. Neither formulation of the distance variable was significant. This finding suggests that a law firm’s
failure to adopt an exclusive forum clause would not be due to a direct conflict of interest between the law firm
and its client regarding the venue of litigation.
85See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen & Stephen P. Lamb, Adopting and Enforcing Effective Forum Selection Provisions
in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 47 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 285 (Feb. 9, 15) (discussing how to adopt the pro-
visions in order to reduce risk of litigation over their enforcement). It is also possible that directors could be
influential in adopting the provisions midstream, as there may be more interlocks in mature companies, with a
corresponding reduced impact of outside counsel on board decisions, in contrast to the drafting of legal docu-
ments at the IPO stage. However, there does not seem to be any such effect. The percentage of midstream adopt-
ers with at least one director on a board that has adopted an exclusive forum provision is 0.33, compared to 0.30
for nonadopters. The paired difference of 0.03 is insignificant (standard error of 0.04).
86Only corporate officers sign the SEC filings of bylaws and certificates of incorporation, and the accompanying
8k, 10k, or 10q filing documents contain no references to outside counsel, even if an external law firm drafted
the provisions. Of course, outside counsel also do not sign the certificates of incorporation and bylaws of IPO
firms, but the offering’s outside counsel is identified in the accompanying prospectus.
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provision by a public corporation midstream will be determined by the firm’s in-house
counsel, a decision that may be independent of outside counsel’s advice. As each gener-
al counsel only advises one company, a law firm light-switch model would not likely
hold across the midstream sample, were data on the use of outside counsel available to
test that hypothesis.
Accordingly, in this section, we instead examine midstream adoptions in terms of
the contention of proxy advisory service providers and institutional investors that exclusive
forum provisions are detrimental to shareholder interests and reflect poor corporate gover-
nance.87 The policy position of proxy advisors is consequential because of their influence
on shareholder voting: the leading provider alone affects as much as 20 percent of share-
holder votes, and directors’ actions are affected by negative votes.88 Criticism of exclusive
forum provisions is most apt when considering midstream bylaw adoptions as they do not
require a shareholder vote. The potential for opportunism in latecomer terms is signifi-
cantly mitigated in the case of charter adoptions that require shareholder approval.
If their criticism were well founded, and exclusive forum clauses were indeed
harmful to shareholders, then we would expect that firms adopting such provisions uni-
laterally would not possess the same, or as many, good governance characteristics as
nonadopters. For if they have such governance mechanisms, then that should prevent
the adoption of bylaws adverse to shareholder welfare. That should also be true of a
comparison between midstream bylaw adopters and adopters by shareholder vote. Oth-
erwise, advisory service providers and institutional investors would be mistaken either
about exclusive forum provisions or about measures of good governance (or about both
the clauses and measures); their position cannot be accurate with respect to both.
1. Comparison of Midstream Bylaw Adopters and Nonadopters
We collected data on four “good governance” characteristics: (1) annual election of
directors, (2) majority voting for directors, (3) the absence of a poison pill unless
adopted by shareholder approval, and (4) an independent board chairman.89 We
include the first three characteristics because those were identified by ISS as informing
its recommendations regarding shareholder voting on exclusive forum clauses when it
87For example, proxy advisory services firm Glass Lewis recommended voting against the election of the director
serving as chairman of the governance committee of corporations adopting a forum selection clause without
obtaining shareholder approval, or those seeking approval in a bundled vote. Allen 2012, supra note 30, at 6. As
Allen notes, the rationale Glass Lewis offered for its position was that the exclusive forum clauses are “not in the
best interests of shareholders.”
88See note 34 (collecting studies of voting impact of leading proxy advisory service firm) and Ertimur et al., supra
note 34 (finding close to half of firms for which ISS issued a withhold-vote recommendation respond to the
underlying issue by the following year, such as adopting the subject of a successful shareholder proposal that
they had previously ignored). Allen attributes the defeat of two proposals to adopt exclusive forum clauses to the
opposition of the proxy advisory services. Allen 2012, supra note 30, at 5, 11.
89We hand-collected governance data from firms’ SEC filings in EDGAR, using the proxy statement and annual
reports filed in the year of the adoption of the exclusive forum provision.
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moved to case-by-case recommendations on the proposals.90 These characteristics are
also a focus of institutional investors’ attention: annual elections, an independent board
chairman, and majority voting for directors are at the top of the list of requirements for
board good governance practices according to the Council of Institutional Investors
(CII), an influential corporate governance advocacy organization of pension and labor
union funds, endowments, and foundations.91 As the proxy advisory service providers
work hand in glove with CII members, it is not surprising that their views on what con-
stitutes good governance are largely identical.
CII considers majority voting (as opposed to plurality voting) as key to board account-
ability because when votes “count” (i.e., when directors can fail to be reelected), directors are
expected to be more effectively constrained by and hence more responsive to shareholders.92
Annual director elections are perceived to serve a similar function. CII also emphasizes the
importance of an independent board chairman for board accountability. An independent
chairman is said to enhance the board’s ability to fulfill its “primary duty” of monitoring man-
agement. The logic is that an independent chairman would constrain the CEO’s influence on
the board and its agenda, thereby preventing insiders’ conflicts of interest.93 ISS and institu-
tional investors also oppose poison pills adopted without shareholder approval, as well as stag-
gered boards, for being managerial entrenchment devices that thwart hostile bids, with the
combination considered particularly potent because, at least theoretically, the bidder would
have to wait two years in order to elect a board majority and repeal the pill.94
We also collected data on ownership of insiders (directors and officers), financial
institutions, and other blockholders, as governance characteristics, as well as adoption
method, can be expected to vary with ownership composition.95 In addition, financial
90See Allen 2012, supra note 30, at 6, and note 35, supra. It should be noted that despite these criteria, according
to Allen, it did not recommend in favor of any of the provisions. Allen 2014, supra note 26, at 8, 12.
91See CII, Policies on Corporate Governance, available at: http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies#intro. CII also
includes in its board governance policies having two-thirds of the board be independent directors, but as stock
exchange rules require a majority to be independent, there is limited potential variation in this variable across
firms. We therefore do not include the variable in the analyses reported in the article. However, we did collect
board independence data and there was no significant difference across adopters and their matched nonadop-
ters, with both groups having 80 percent independent directors, nor was it significant when included in the mul-
tivariate regression.
92E.g., CII, Majority Voting for Directors, available at: http://www.cii.org/majority_voting_directors. Consistent
with that perception, Yonca Ertimur and colleagues find that boards subject to majority voting are more respon-
sive to shareholder proposals (increasing the rate of implementation) and to withheld votes in elections. Yonca
Ertimur et al., Does the Director Election System Matter? Evidence from Majority Voting, 20 Rev. Account. Stud.
1 (2015).
93E.g., CII, Independent Board Chair, available at: http://www.cii.org/independent_boardchair.
94E.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Poli-
cy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887 (2002). In many if not most instances, however, when a bidder succeeds in electing a
minority, a board will respond to the bid and not engage in a multiyear contest.
95Ownership data were hand-collected from the firms’ proxy statements and annual reports filed with the SEC
available on EDGAR, in the year in which the bylaw was adopted.
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blockholders can be characterized as a governance mechanism complementing majority
voting, independent chairmen, and annual elections. Such blockholders can serve a
monitoring function because the cost-benefit calculation of a blockholder is favorable
for obtaining information and engaging in oversight. We compare the governance and
ownership features in firms whose boards have adopted exclusive forum bylaws to nona-
dopters in this section, and to firms whose exclusive forum provisions have been
approved by shareholders in the next section.
The bylaw adopters used in our comparison tests consist solely of “clean” bylaw
adoptions, which we define as exclusive forum bylaws that are adopted in the ordinary
course of business, and not event driven (i.e., e.g., not adopted in conjunction with a
merger agreement). As indicated in Panel D of Table 1, there are 291 such adoptions in
total.96 A higher proportion of the clean adoptions are by non-Delaware domiciled firms
(13 percent) compared to the full set of midstream adoptions.97 In addition, they are
not especially subject to litigation: only 30 percent of clean adopters are in industry sec-
tors conventionally identified as at high risk for securities litigation, the same percent-
age as in the full sample.98 By contrast, a higher percentage of firms whose bylaws were
adopted in conjunction with a merger are in the high-risk litigation sectors (45 per-
cent).99 In addition, slightly under half of clean midstream bylaws were adopted simulta-
neously with other bylaw changes (47 percent), suggesting that in such instances the
provision might well have been added following a comprehensive “housekeeping” review
of the company’s governance, although it is also quite possible that in instances of mul-
tiple amendments, consideration of a forum selection clause sparked the broader
evaluation.
We use clean bylaw adopters, whether the bylaw was adopted solely or with other
provisions, for our governance comparison tests because the decision to adopt a provi-
sion in these instances is not confounded by other events, such as a merger, that could
96There are 36 exclusive forum bylaws that are not clean unilateral adoptions: 24 adopted in conjunction with a
merger; three adopted simultaneous with emergence from a bankruptcy reorganization; and nine approved by
shareholders (votes or written consents). As indicated in Panel D of Table 1, the remaining 65 midstream forum
selection clauses are charter amendments.
97A much higher percentage of firms putting the provision up to a shareholder vote, both separate or bundled,
are Delaware firms (98 percent), while that of firms using written consent (88 percent) is roughly the same as
that of firms with board-adopted bylaws (87 percent).
98The literature on federal securities litigation has identified firms as high risk in four-digit SIC codes for the bio-
tech, computer, electronics, and retail sectors. Kim & Skinner, supra note 48, at 295 n.18 & 297. Shareholder
derivative suits are reported as accompanying approximately 30 percent of federal securities lawsuits. Erickson,
supra note 42. Because there is no comparable work identifying industries prone to derivative suits, we use the
industries identified as high risk for federal securities litigation as our proxy for firms being at high risk for state
law litigation, recognizing that the correlation is low.
99The higher percentage could be related to mergers occurring in waves clustered by industry. See, e.g., Gregor
Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. Econ. Persps. 103, 104 (Spring 2001) (“two
most consistent empirical features of merger activity over the last century [are that] mergers occur in waves; and
within a wave, mergers strongly cluster by industry”).
68 Romano and Sanga
be related to governance characteristics. However, we exclude bylaw adoptions of con-
trolled companies (a stock exchange classification for firms with a 50 percent share-
holder that permits exceptions from independent director requirements), dual-class
stock companies, and of companies that subsequently put the bylaw to a shareholder
vote. The rationale for the exclusions is that those companies either could have
obtained (or actually did obtain) shareholder approval for the provision, so the mode
of adoption—board rather than shareholder action—is of no practical consequence,
and hence we would not learn anything useful about the efficacy of unilateral board
adoption by comparing such adopters to nonadopters or to adopters by actual share-
holder vote. In addition, the governance of firms with a controlling shareholder can-
not be compared to that of firms without such a shareholder because even the same
mechanism on paper will operate differently in a controlled company context. Their
inclusion would therefore confound an analysis comparing the governance quality of
adopters by unilateral board action and nonadopters. This results in a final sample of
249 bylaw adopters.
To construct a comparison group, we matched each of the 249 bylaw adopters to
a nonadopter according to year, industry, firm size, and domicile.100 Seven bylaw adopt-
ers could not be matched.101 This left a sample of 242 bylaw adopters and a matched
sample of 242 nonadopters. The 242 adopters are representative of the full sample of
291 “clean” midstream bylaw adopters. The same proportion are non-Delaware domi-
ciled firms (13 percent) and in high-risk securities litigation industries (30 percent). In
addition, approximately the same proportion adopted multiple bylaw amendments with
the exclusive forum clause (48 percent). Finally, the same percentage adopted the bylaw
post-Chevron (80 percent). They can therefore reasonably be said to be a representative
sample of the population of clean adopters.
Table 4 presents paired t tests of differences in means of the governance and own-
ership variables between clean midstream bylaw adopters and their matched nonadop-
ters. As shown in the table, two good governance variables, the presence of an
independent chairman of the board and majority voting for directors, are significantly
higher among adopting firms than among nonadopters.102 There are no significant
100See the Appendix for details on the matching procedure.
101Six adopting firms were not in the CRSP database and one firm could not be matched according to our proce-
dure because there was no nonadopter that was “close.” See the Appendix.
102We report the findings for a stricter definition of independent chairman than there simply being different
individuals in the positions to require that there be a nonexecutive chairman, that is, excluding from the classifi-
cation of independent chair firms that have separated the positions but whose chairman is an executive
employed by the firm, as well as firms whose chairman is a former executive but counted as independent under
stock exchange rules for having been retired for three years. The results are unaffected if we use any of the three
possible definitions of independence, different individuals, only nonexecutive chairmen, and only nonexecutive
chairmen who are also not former executives. We also constructed a governance “index,” the sum for each firm
of the number of the four good governance variables that it has; the adopters have better total governance, aver-
aging a score of 2.4, compared to 2.2 for the nonadopters, but a paired t test is marginally significant at 9 per-
cent (two-tailed test).
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differences in takeover defenses (staggered boards and poison pills) or any of the own-
ership variables. These findings are distinctively at odds with the view of ISS and CII
that exclusive forum provisions reflect poor corporate governance. They also differ from
that of Wilson’s study, which found that the separation of the CEO and chairman posi-
tion was not significantly related to adoption, a difference that underscores the need to
separately analyze different types of adoptions. The absence of indicia of managerial
entrenchment along with the more frequent presence of features that institutional
investors regard as good governance (independent chairmen and majority voting)
among adopters than nonadopters is consistent with the inference that boards adopting
exclusive forum provisions are behaving as responsible fiduciaries of their
shareholders.103
Table 4: Midstream Governance Differences: EFC Aadopters v. Nonadopters
(Paired t Tests)
Governance EFC Firms Non-EFC Firms Difference Observations
No staggered board 0.58 0.62 20.04 242
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
No poison pill 0.83 0.86 20.03 237
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Independent chair 0.44 0.34 0.10* 230
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Majority voting 0.48 0.40 0.08* 242
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
% Financial institution ownership 23.99 23.67 0.32 240
(1.00) (0.99) (1.29)
% D&O ownership 9.16 9.24 20.09 240
(0.72) (0.71) (0.86)
% Blockholder ownership 25.97 27.01 21.04 239
(0.97) (1.03) (1.30)
# Blockholders 3.16 3.29 20.14 241
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15)
NOTES: This table reports differences in governance characteristics between firms that have adopted an exclusive
forum clause midstream (EFC Firms) and firms that have not (Non-EFC Firms). The sample is clean adoption
(i.e., not adopted in conjunction with an event, such as a merger) EFC firms (242 total) and a matched sample
of 242 non-EFC firms. The “Difference” column lists the results of a paired t test. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. *Indicates statistically significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, SEC EDGAR.
103This interpretation is further supported by the fact that shareholders of the vast majority of the firms could
repeal the bylaw if they so desired. Only slightly more than one-quarter (27 percent) of the adopting firms have
a supermajority requirement for shareholder bylaw amendments, compared to 25 percent of the nonadopters, a
difference that is statistically insignificant (paired t test value of 0.52). Scott Hirst reports that 42 percent of the
firms in the Russell 3000 index have supermajority requirements for all or some bylaw changes. Scott Hirst, Fro-
zen Charters, 34 Yale J. Reg. (forthcoming). That proportion is higher than the corresponding proportion of
exclusive forum clause adopters, as well as their matches (36 percent and 38 percent, respectively). While given
the focus of his analysis Hirst treats the two types of supermajority requirements as interchangeable, it should be
noted that when supermajority requirements apply to only specified bylaws (9 and 13 percent of adopters and
matches, respectively), the locked-in provisions concern shareholder meetings, director elections, and indemnifi-
cation, and hence do not impact shareholders’ ability to overturn an exclusive forum clause.
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As a robustness check, we rerun the paired t tests separately for firms in high secu-
rities litigation risk sectors (70 firms) and those that are not (160 firms). There are no
significant differences in mean in the governance variables for the smaller sized subsam-
ple of high-risk litigation firms, and the direction is the same as in the full sample, that
is, adopters have a higher proportion of independent chairmen and majority voting,
albeit insignificantly so, than do nonadopters.104 These data provide further support for
a characterization of exclusive forum bylaw adoptions as not adverse to shareholders
because we do not find that nonadopters have better governance than adopters when
we separately examine firms that might be more likely to have use of the clauses (those
in high securities risk litigation sectors).
We also run a logit regression for the probability of adoption of an exclusive
forum clause on the governance and ownership variables. We run the regressions using
all observations and using only observations where both the adopter and nonadopter of
a pair have no missing observations (resulting in 463 and 446 observations, respectively).
As reported in Table 5, in both specifications, the presence of majority voting and an
independent chairman are significantly positively related to the presence of the provi-
sion, as is the percentage owned by blockholders that are financial institutions. No other
variables are significant.105 These findings bolster the conclusion from the paired com-
parison tests regarding the implausibility that exclusive forum provisions harm share-
holders, for they indicate that the managers of adopters are likely to be subject to more
effective monitoring, and hence more effectively constrained from taking opportunistic
action, than nonadopters.
2. Comparison of Midstream Adopters by Approval Process
We next compare the governance and ownership characteristics of adopters according
to the mechanism of adoption, by bylaw or by shareholder vote or written consent. The
rationale for this approach is that were there significant governance differences across
these subsamples of midstream adopters, then the difference in the mechanism of adop-
tion (by board or shareholder approval) could matter quite importantly. In particular,
were critics correct that midstream bylaw adoptions are instances of managerial oppor-
tunism that reduce shareholder wealth, then we should expect to find that bylaw
104If the simple definition of independent chairman referring to firms in which different individuals hold the
two positions is used, then the mean difference for the high-risk litigation matched pairs of 0.1571 with a t statis-
tic of 1.953 is significant at 6 percent. The independent chairman variable remains significant for the larger sub-
sample of firms in sectors not at high risk of litigation, but the majority voting variable is no longer significant.
105We also ran the regressions including the percentage of independent directors, a high securities litigation risk
indicator variable, and the director interlock variable, described in note 85; these variables were all insignificant.
We further ran the regression replacing the four governance variables with the governance index (see note 102);
the index is marginally significant at 10 percent. Finally, we separately ran the regression for pairs of firms adopt-
ing the clause before and after the Chevron decision. The majority voting and independent chairmen votes are
significantly positive in the larger post-Chevron sample but insignificant in the pre-Chevron sample, which may well
be a function of the test’s low power, given the smaller size of the sample (20 percent of the full group), as the
direction is the same (more of the adopters have these provisions than do the nonadopters).
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adopters are more poorly governed than adopters that seek, and obtain, shareholder
approval, for the managers who would engage in such action should be those not sub-
ject to effective board or shareholder monitoring.
The first three columns of Table 6 report differences in mean comparison tests
between clean bylaw adopters and companies that adopted a provision by (1) a separate
shareholder vote, (2) a bundled shareholder vote, or (3) written consents.106 There are no
significant differences in governance characteristics between companies with board-
Table 5: Midstream Governance Differences: EFC Adopters v. Nonadopters
(Multivariate Analysis)
Dependent Variable is an Indicator for Exclusive Forum Clause
Sample
Governance All Nonmissing Pairs
No staggered board 20.14 20.09
(0.20) (0.21)
No poison pill 20.18 20.22
(0.27) (0.27)
Independent chair 0.42* 0.43*
(0.20) (0.20)
Majority voting 0.50* 0.46*
(0.21) (0.22)
% Financial institution ownership 0.04* 0.03*
(0.02) (0.02)
% D&O ownership 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
% Blockholder ownership 20.01 20.01
(0.02) (0.02)





NOTES: The sample is clean adoption (i.e., not adopted in conjunction with an event, such as a merger) EFC
firms (242 total) and a matched sample of 242 non-EFC firms. *Indicates statistically significantly different from
zero at 95 percent confidence.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, SEC EDGAR.
106Because all but one of the written consents to an exclusive forum provision were bundled with other items, it
is combined with the bundled consents for the analysis. We calculate the t test significance levels both with and
without using the Bonferroni method of adjustment for multiple comparison tests. See, e.g., Paul E. Green, Ana-
lyzing Multivariate Data 221--23 (1978). As these comparison tests compare subsets of adopters over the same vari-
ables, in contrast to the t tests in Table 4 that are not interdependent, the Bonferroni adjustment is appropriate
in assessing the significance of the differences in means in this table as opposed to that one. As there is no signif-
icant difference in the proportion adopting elective clauses by type of midstream adoption---whether the bylaws
are compared to the three different voting categories or all shareholder-approved proposals combined (respec-
tive chi-squares of 1.07 (p5 0.301) and 2.4 (p5 0.499)) we do not analyze any of the governance differences in
relation to the format of the clauses. The average variable values for clean bylaw adopters used in these tests vary
slightly from those reported in Table 4 because the comparisons in this section include all clean bylaw adopters
and not only those that could be matched.
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adopted exclusive forum provisions and those whose provisions were adopted by separate
shareholder votes (Column 1).107 In contrast, companies that adopted the provisions in
bundled votes or by written consent are less likely to have majority voting than companies
with clean bylaw adoptions (Columns 2 and 3). These data suggest that criticism of mid-
stream bylaw adoption is misplaced, as adopters that did not have shareholder consent are,
if anything, more likely to exhibit good governance. However, it should be noted that
Table 6: Midstream Governance Differences: By Method of EFC Adoption















No staggered board 20.12 20.07 0.19 20.04 20.29
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
No poison pill 0.08 0.10 0.16 20.02 20.07
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)
Independent chair 20.16 20.14 20.28 20.02 0.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.14) (0.18)
Majority voting 20.16 20.28† 20.36† 0.12 0.14
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
% Financial institution
ownership
0.90 23.37 221.32* 4.27 20.27*
(3.42) (3.72) (5.16) (5.30) (5.68)
%D&O ownership 4.72 7.23 28.48* 22.51 222.62†
(3.97) (4.27) (5.99) (6.95) (8.83)
% Blockholder
ownership
7.69 2.68 20.63* 5.01 215.23
(3.93) (4.28) (6.39) (6.45) (9.29)
# Blockholders 0.43 0.25 22.03* 0.18 2.38*
(0.39) (0.43) (0.59) (0.70) (0.76)
Litigation 20.02 0.00 0.11 20.02 20.12
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Fraction in first group 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.52 0.74
Observations
(min–max)
303–316 301–314 287–308 43–48 51–65
NOTES: Standard errors from an unpaired t test are in parentheses. “Observations” gives the range of the total
number of observations in the two groups. There is a range because of missing data. †Indicates statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence without correcting for multiple hypothesis testing. *Indicates
statistically significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence after correcting for multiple hypothesis test-
ing with Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels.
SOURCES: Bloomberg, SEC EDGAR.
107Consistent with the contention that bylaw adopters are not less prone to be effectively monitored, the action
of boards adopting the provisions unilaterally are not more likely to be subject to reversal by shareholder action
than those of firms putting the clauses up to a separate shareholder vote. That is because there is no statistically
significant difference in the percentage of firms with supermajority requirements for shareholder bylaw changes
between clean bylaw adopters and firms putting the provisions to a separate shareholder vote (27 percent com-
pared to 32 percent, respectively).
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these are small samples, so the tests have low power. There are 291 clean bylaws, but only
25 separate shareholder votes, 23 bundled votes, and 17 written consents.108
Firms using written consent have significantly higher insider ownership, signifi-
cantly lower ownership by financial institutions, and significantly fewer outside block-
holders than bylaw adopters or those putting the proposals up to a shareholder vote.
This is as expected because, to use the written consent route successfully, insiders need
to have over 50 percent of shares (or close enough so that they can ally with an outside
blockholder and meet the threshold). Indeed, the over 20 percent higher ownership of
written consent firms is approximately equal to the higher margin of approval received
by provisions adopted by written consent compared to those voted on at meetings (78
percent approval by written consent compared to 65 and 67 percent, respectively, for
separate and bundled votes). The absence of a significant difference between support
for exclusive forum clauses across separate and bundled votes is at odds with the conten-
tion of critics of bundled voting that provisions approved when bundled would not be
approved if separately proposed.109
The more important finding regarding ownership composition is that there is no sig-
nificant ownership difference between bylaw adopters and adopters by separate sharehold-
er vote. Indeed, the difference is so small that it would not be sufficient to make a
difference in outcome were the mode of adoption reversed across the firms.110 Hence, a
108Logit regressions were also run for the probability of a firm adopting by a shareholder vote on the governance
and ownership variables and a high litigation risk dummy. Whether firms adopting by written consents are
included as firms adopting by a shareholder vote, or excluded from the regression, the presence of majority vot-
ing is significant and negative, that is, bylaw adopters have higher-quality governance (the presence of majority
voting is a predictor of adoption by unilateral board action), which is at odds with a negative perception of that
mode of adoption. In addition, when written consents are included in the analysis, blockholder ownership is pos-
itively related to adoption by shareholder approval; the effect becomes only marginally significant (at 7 percent)
when those firms are excluded from the analysis. No other variables are significant in either regression.
109See Lucian Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1549, 1594--95 (2010)
(bundling merger approvals with a staggered board in the surviving entity’s charter are provided as evidence that
the subjects of bundled votes would not be approved if voted separately and the paper concludes by advocating
“state and federal public officials . . . take the necessary steps to prevent [any bundled voting] from ‘undermining
the value of shareholder voting’”). The CII’s corporate governance policies also disfavor bundled votes, as
opposed to advocating a policy that would tailor opposition to bundling informed by the nature of the proposals.
See http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies (“Bundled Voting: Shareowners should be allowed to vote on unrelated
issues separately. Individual voting issues (particularly those amending a company’s charter), bylaws or anti-
takeover provisions should not be bundled.”). Further, the absence of differential voting support for the exclusive
forum provision achieved by bundled votes is not a function of greater inside ownership in those firms compared
to firms holding separate votes, for there is also no significant difference in inside ownership across the firms.
110For example, the two firms whose separate vote proposals failed had far lower inside, block, and financial insti-
tution ownership than the average of firms whose proposals were approved, as well as of all midstream adopters,
and 4 or 5 percent more shares (the average ownership difference between shareholder approved adopters and
midstream bylaw adopters) would not have made a difference in those outcomes. Allstate Corp.’s proposal
received 42 percent of outstanding shares and Cameron International Corp’s received 40 percent. Calculated
from Allstate Corp., Form 8-K, filed May 18, 2011 and Form Def.14A, filed Apr. 1, 2011; and Cameron Interna-
tional Corp., Form 8-K, filed May 15, 2012 and Form Def. 14A, filed Mar. 28, 2012. Both firms’ governance char-
acteristics were not qualitatively worse than those of the firms whose proposals were approved: they both had
annual election and majority voting (compared to less than half of firms with approved provisions), but not
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plausible explanation for why boards continue to opt for unilateral adoption is not because
of fear that shareholders would disapprove, but because it is cheaper. We would not, how-
ever, expect exclusive forum provisions to become as universal among publicly traded com-
panies as they are in IPOs without a shift in the position of influential investor
organizations such as ISS and CII with respect to the clauses. Given that most shareholder
litigation involves acquisitions and the probability of being acquired is quite low for most
corporations, many independent directors may rationally calculate the benefits of the pro-
vision as remote compared to the cost of taking action that might lead to a negative voting
recommendation by the proxy advisory services, and consequent reputational damage.111
Taken as a whole, the findings are at odds with critics’ view of exclusive forum
bylaws and particularly the positions of the CII and proxy advisory services. In the view of
those institutions, a responsible board of directors would not adopt an exclusive forum
provision unilaterally but would only adopt such a provision, if at all, by putting it to a
separate shareholder vote. Yet by that standard, companies adopting exclusive forum
bylaws exhibit no worse, and in some instances exhibit higher, quality governance than
those putting the provisions up to shareholder approval (whether voted on separately or
bundled). Because there is also no difference in inside ownership between bylaw adopters
and separate vote adopters, one cannot assume that the bylaw mechanism was used solely
to avoid a losing shareholder vote. In sum, bylaw adopters would appear to be subject to
no less monitoring by shareholders or directors than are shareholder vote adopters.
It might be alternatively contended that firms strategically adopt good governance
features as a means of obtaining shareholder goodwill, which they then can exploit by
taking other opportunistic actions such as adopting an exclusive forum clause without
fear of shareholder retaliation. The prevalence of elective provisions might suggest that
to be the case, as the motivation for their adoption is unclear.112 However, misuse of
independent chairmen (as is also true of over half of firms with approved provisions). Moreover, like all but one
of the firms with approved provisions, they did not have poison pills. In short, the two firms whose proposals
were defeated met all of ISS’s stated governance criteria, in contrast to most firms putting up the provisions to a
separate vote, although ISS did not recommend voting in favor of those provisions or any other. Allen 2012,
supra note 30, at 6. There would appear to have been other problems at Allstate that created shareholder discon-
tent because the “say-on-pay” vote, in which shareholders are asked to approve the chief executive’s compensa-
tion package on an advisory basis, received an extremely low level of support at 57 percent.
111There are data suggestive of this concern: ISS recommendations against a directors’ election result in higher
levels of no or withheld votes, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 34, and a comprehensive study of director elections
found that directors who receive a high percentage of withheld votes are more likely to lose their position on
that board or on other firms’ boards. Reena Aggarwal et al., The Power of Shareholder Votes: Evidence from
Uncontested Director Elections, Georgetown University McDonough School of Business Research Paper No.
2609532, Nov. 2016 (examining all elections from 2003 to 2010 or over 59,000 individual director events, finds
the proportion of withheld votes is significantly related to turnover on that board and other directorships within
one year of that election).
112Grundfest states that the elective format is a “savings” clause, intended to operate as a “fiduciary out,” so that
directors can fulfill their fiduciary obligations where it would be in the shareholders’ best interest to sue outside
of the exclusive forum state. Grundfest, supra note 5, at 383. However, by providing the directors the choice of
forum, it could be viewed as providing directors with an “out” to pursue a collusive settlement with a more ame-
nable plaintiff in another state. Cf. Allen 2012, supra note 26, at 7 (“plaintiffs’ bar might argue [it] allow[s] the
board . . . to engage in forum shopping”).
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this feature should not be troubling. The Delaware courts can be expected to police an
election to settle with a more amenable plaintiff elsewhere (as other plaintiffs would
seek to enforce the exclusive forum clause in Delaware) as they have a longstanding rec-
ognition of the problem of collusive settlements,113 and, along with the legislature and
bar, have strong incentives to control their case law, as it is a source of substantial reve-
nue for the state.114 It would, moreover, seem implausible that an opportunistic board
would draw down its goodwill on an exclusive forum provision, whether or not elective,
rather than for a far more consequential entrenching provision, such as a staggered
board or plurality voting, which is the ostensible tradeoff in the data. Indeed, the costs
of multijurisdictional litigation are not even directly borne by board members, as out-
side directors are rarely, if ever, personally liable for fiduciary breach.115
V. Conclusion
In this article, we have documented the rise of exclusive forum provisions—provisions
that corporations adopt in their bylaws or charters in order to prevent multiforum
shareholder litigation. In particular, we ask what drives the extraordinary growth in
these provisions and whether (as some critics contend) their adoption reflects bad cor-
porate governance or managerial opportunism. To answer these questions, we separately
analyze companies that adopted such provisions at the IPO stage and those that adopted
them midstream.
We draw two principal conclusions from the IPO data: (1) the rate of exclusive
forum clause adoption at the IPO is approaching universality as it has increased steadily
from 0 to 80 percent between 2010–2014 and (2) the entire transition is primarily—if
not entirely—driven by law firms; the characteristics of individual companies play little
or no role even in individual adoption decisions, and the effect of investment bankers,
as well as of interlocking directors (i.e., directors who serve on firms with exclusive
forum clauses), is swamped by that of the law firms. Moreover, the pattern of adoption
follows what can be described as a light-switch model, in which once a law firm includes
a clause in an IPO, it does so for all subsequent IPOs. The near-universal adoption of
these provisions across IPO firms, in comparison to staggered boards, further suggests
113Grundfest, supra note 5, at 387. That recognition is evidenced by a recent trend of Chancery Court decisions
to reject settlements in a subset of acquisition cases, in which defendants make nonmaterial additional disclo-
sures and pay six-digit fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys in exchange for a universal release. E.g., In re Trulia, Inc.
Stockholders Litig., CA No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016).
114E.g., Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 7--8 (1993).
115See, e.g., Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055
(2006) (finding only 13 cases in the past 25 years in which an outside director of a public company made an out-
of-pocket payment, and noting most of these fact patterns would not result in personal payouts for companies
with “state-of-the-art” directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policies). That is not to say that directors bear no
cost, as litigation can be accompanied by considerable nonmonetary costs, such as the personal stress from being
a defendant or potential reputational damage, but the higher legal expense for having to litigate in multiple
courts comes from the corporation’s coffers and hence the shareholders’ pockets.
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that lawyers have come to perceive that, in contrast to takeover defenses, exclusive
forum provisions are “best practice” and universally beneficial.
For the midstream adoptions, we find almost no significant differences in gover-
nance features across midstream bylaw adopters and nonadopters. Further, when there
is a significant difference, it is the adopters that have higher-quality governance (using
the metrics of prominent organizations that are leading critics of the provisions, ISS and
CII). We also find no significant differences in ownership and governance structures
between firms whose boards adopt bylaws and those who obtain shareholder approval.
The findings are consistent with the contention that boards that unilaterally adopt a
bylaw provision are acting as responsible fiduciaries, and accordingly that the mode of
adoption should not be of import to investors.
Appendix: Matching Procedure for Midstream Adopters
We matched each midstream adopter to a nonadopting corporation according to year,
industry, and firm size. Each midstream adopter was matched to the “closest” firm as of
the end of the year prior to adoption, where “close” is determined according to differ-
ences in firm size and industry. We matched on size and industry in the prior year
because a substantial number (35 percent) of midstream adoptions occurred in 2014
and that year’s data were not yet available. The tradeoff between firm size and industry
follows a simple rule that is outlined below. A nonadopting company is matched to at
most one midstream adopter.
The matching procedure is as follows:
1. Restrict the pool of potential matches to all U.S-domiciled public corporations
that have never adopted an exclusive forum clause and are neither controlled
nor dual-class stock companies.
2. For each midstream adopter:
a. Restrict potential matches to firms that have the same statutory domicile
(Delaware or non-Delaware). Further restrict to firms operating in the same
year in which the midstream firm adopted the exclusive forum clause. For
example, if the firm adopted the clause in 2012, then only firms operating
in 2012 are potential matches and differences in firm size and industry (ref-
erenced below) are with respect to firm size and industry of the potential
matches as of the end of 2011.
b. Rank all potential matches according to their absolute percentage difference
in firm size.
c. Find the closest firm (in terms of firm size) that has the same four-digit Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. If the difference in firm size is less
than 50 percent, assign that firm as the match, skip the remaining steps, and
proceed to the next midstream adopter to be matched. Otherwise, continue.
d. Find the closest firm (in terms of firm size) that has the same three-digit SIC
code. If the difference in firm size is less than 50 percent, assign that firm as
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the match, skip the remaining steps, and proceed to the next midstream
adopter to be matched. Otherwise, continue.
e. Find the closest firm (in terms of firm size) that has the same two-digit SIC
code. If the difference in firm size is less than 50 percent, assign that firm as
the match, skip the remaining step, and proceed to the next midstream
adopter to be matched. Otherwise, continue.
f. Find the closest firm (in terms of firm size) that has the same two-, three-, or
four-digit SIC code. Assign that firm as the match and proceed to the next
midstream adopter to be matched.
If Step 2 matches the same nonadopter to more than one adopter, the nonadop-
ter is assigned to the adopter for which it is ranked higher (according to firm size and
industry). For example, suppose Nonadopter A is matched to both Adopter Y and
Adopter Z. If A was Y’s third-closest match but Z’s first-closest match, then A is assigned
to Z. Y is then assigned to its next-closest match.
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